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Abstract: This paper traces the history of direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising for prescription drugs in
the United States, beginning with the enactment of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act in 1938
and continuing through the current state of FDA regulation. A detailed analysis of how the promulgation
of DTC ads has aﬀected a variety of groups (including consumers, the medical profession, pharmaceutical
companies, the government, and advertisers) is followed by a brief look at a well-known DTC ad campaign
(Schering-Plough’s Claritin). The paper questions whether DTC ads are a constructive or a deconstructive
element of the American healthcare system and concludes by oﬀering an opinion on the current state of DTC
advertising regulation and enforcement by the FDA.
1I. INTRODUCTION
As clouds and balloons ﬂoat across the screen and music plays in the background, a voice promises “nothing
but blue skies from now on.” Joan Lunden shares that, while she used to suﬀer from severe allergies, today
she is pollen-free, and you could be too. Mike Piazza swings at a pitch while telling you that he doesn’t
have to worry about seasonal allergies anymore. For millions of Americans, these words, sounds, and images,
all taken from the television and print ads for the prescription antihistamine Claritin, are some of the most
familiar advertisements of the last ﬁve years. These pervasive sights and sounds have helped to make the
Schering-Plough drug Claritin one of the most prescribed pharmaceuticals in the United States, and the
same type of persuasive advertising has made blockbusters out of Prilosec, Viagra, Vioxx, Singulair, Zoloft
and Lipitor as well, just to name a few.
To the average American consumer, prescription drug advertisements are such a staple of the modern media
experience that it seems as though the ads have always been around. While prescription drugs were advertised
occasionally in mainstream print publications prior to 1997, it has been only in the last ﬁve years that the
broadcast ad campaigns with which we are so familiar today were aﬃrmatively authorized by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA), the federal regulatory agency with authority over the marketing of prescription
drugs.
In 1997, the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications (DDMAC), a sub-division of
the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER), which is a division of the FDA, released guidelines
which allow prescription drug manufacturers to comfortably satisfy the legal requirements for advertising
their products to the general public. As a result, pharmaceutical companies have swelled their direct-to-
2consumer (DTC) marketing budgets and provided the advertising industry with a proﬁtable new line of
products to promote. Since the regulatory change was announced, name-brand prescription drug use in the
United States has increased, drug prices have gone up, a debate over the eﬀects, eﬃcacy and wisdom of
DTC ads has ensued, and scores of heath care issues that aﬀect patients, doctors, insurers, and the federal
government have risen to the surface.
This paper is an attempt to outline and update the development, success, and debate over DTC advertising.
The starting point will be a review of DTC advertising history, the current DTC guidelines, and the FDA’s
enforcement of those guidelines. Next, the paper looks at the past, present and future impact of DTC adver-
tising on the various groups associated with prescription drug promotion, groups such as consumers/patients,
pharmaceutical companies, physicians, health insurers, advertising agencies, media, and the federal and state
governments. After the rules are established and their impact fully explored, the paper will look at perhaps
the most illustrative “case study” in DTC promotion: the Schering-Plough antihistamine Claritin. This case
study will provide anecdotal evidence as to how DTC advertising has aﬀected the pharmaceutical industry
and its consumers. However, it should be noted that the Claritin case is not intended to be representative
of all prescription drug DTC ad campaigns. The conclusion of this paper will attempt to answer one ﬁnal
question: Is DTC advertising a good thing for healthcare in America?
II. THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act) was passed by Congress in 1938 in an eﬀort to federally
protect the health and safety of the nation by regulating the food and medical supply.1 Speciﬁcally, the Act
1See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (1994).
3regulates the pharmaceutical industry to ensure the safety and eﬃcacy of drugs produced and sold in the
United States, and it gives the FDA authority to carry out its legislative directives. In 1962, Congress added
the Kefauver-Harris amendments which, among other things, transferred regulatory authority for prescrip-
tion drug “advertising” from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which exercises authority over general
advertising, to the FDA.2 With the addition of the 1962 amendments, the regulation of drugs became the
most consuming, and at times the most controversial, aspect of all the FDA’s activities.3
In an eﬀort to protect consumer reliance on the safety and eﬃcacy of prescription drugs, Congress determined
that the content of pharmaceutical advertising must be carefully monitored to avoid confusion, to protect
against misinformation, and to provide for full and up-to-date disclosures of the drug’s risks and side eﬀects.4
The Act requires that manufacturers who market prescription drugs to consumers with ads that mention
the drug’s use and/or eﬀectiveness must provide the following: the drug’s established name, the brand name
(if any), the ingredients, and “information in brief summary relating to side eﬀects, contraindications, and
eﬀectiveness.”5 This form of disclosure is referred to as the “brief summary” (an ironic term in light of the
anything-but-brief requirements the statute imposes). If the ad appears in print form, it must also present
the drug’s speciﬁc risks in more detail.6
If an advertisement is broadcast by television, radio, or over the telephone, it must include the brief summary
as outlined above unless the ad contains language that gives “adequate provision for the dissemination of the
approved package labeling.”7 This adequate provision requirement is intended as a compromise - a balance
of the Act’s desire to fully inform a viewer or listener with the brief summary information and its recognition
2See Drug Amendments of 1962, 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (1962). It should be noted that the only kind of “prescription drug
advertising” contemplated by drafters of the Kefauver-Harris amendments was direct-to-physician, not direct-to-consumer. See
S. Rep. 87-1744 87TH Cong., 2ND Sess. 1962, 1962 WL 4821 (Leg.Hist.), at 2895.
3Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law 13 (1991).
4See S. Rep 87-1744, supra note 2.
521 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1).
6Id. As part of the FDA’s new drug application (NDA) approval process, pharmaceutical companies must fully disclose a
drug’s speciﬁc risks on the drug’s package labeling. Labeling is a highly regulated drug information mechanism that is often
connected to the policy and regulations for prescription drug advertising.
721 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1).
4of the inherent limitations of a 30-second TV or radio spot. Adequate provision allows a consumer to obtain
necessary precautionary information while allowing the pharmaceutical company to eﬀectively “market” the
product.
A 1985 FDA interpretation of the Act that appeared in the Federal Register states that if an advertisement
satisﬁes the adequate provision requirement, the brief summary may be reduced to a “major statement,”
which is a disclosure of the product’s major risks in both the audio and any visual element of the ad.8 This
reduction in what must be disclosed by the ad itself is the birthplace of DTC advertising – an issue that
became a dominant one for both the FDA and the pharmaceutical industry in the 1990s.
Despite the wide enforcement authority generally given to the FDA, the Act expressly prohibits any require-
ment that pharmaceutical companies submit drug advertising content for FDA pre-market approval (except
in extraordinary circumstances).9 This provision, grounded in First Amendment doctrine,10 has led to a
regulatory regime that can only oﬀer a pre-market approval process11 and enforce compliance post-violation.
This protection of the pharmaceutical company’s right to speak has occasionally led to the dissemination
of harmful information - information that does not satisfy the Act’s “true statement” requirement that all
advertisements present a “fair balance” of the drug’s beneﬁts and risks.12
III. THE HISTORY OF DTC ADVERTISING UNDER THE ACT
850 Fed. Reg. 36,677 (1985).
921 U.S.C.A. § 352(n).
10A basic tenant of the First Amendment is the prohibition of prior restraint on speech. See Lovell v. Griﬃn, 303 U.S. 444
(1938); Thomas Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 506 (1970).
1121 C.F.R. § 202.1 (j)(4). It is interesting to note, however, that this express prohibition of prior approval for ad content does
not apply to other forms of pharmaceutical speech, such as the required pre-market approval of package labeling for prescription
drugs. For more on this issue, see infra Part IV: Advertising Industry and the Media, at 58.
12Id. at (e)(5). A prescription drug ad is not a “true statement” if “it fails to present a fair balance between information
relating to side eﬀects and contraindications and information relating to eﬀectiveness of the drug....” Id. at (e)(5)(ii).
5For many years, the concept of advertising directly to consumers did not have much appeal for pharmaceuti-
cal companies. The very deﬁnition of “prescription drugs,” drugs that are distributed only under a doctor’s
orders, casts the physician in the role of gatekeeper; if a drug manufacturer can persuade the doctor as to
a drug’s eﬀectiveness, it has won the consumer/patient by default. Drug companies spend a tremendous
percentage of their marketing budgets on physician literature, free samples, gifts, conventions, and various
other “incentives” that persuade doctors to prescribe the manufacturer’s products as often as possible.13
This traditional system of physician-focused information distribution has been facilitated by a pervasive
theme in the US medical model: paternalism. Under this traditional model, the physician/patient relation-
ship follows a role-play format, with the physician in the role of the knowledgeable, dominant doctor and the
patient in the part of the obedient layman who trusts the doctor to act only in the patient’s best interest.
Patients ask very few questions, perhaps due to intimidation or out of respect for the doctor’s experience
and judgment; medical decisions involve complex and highly developed expertise that physicians are relied
upon to provide. 14 Some ethicists place an aﬃrmative duty on the physician to communicate all of the
information they have about a particular drug, its eﬀects, and why the prescription is right for an individual
patient. However, with time constraints and natural limitations on physician knowledge, this frank exchange
is not as likely to occur as the “traditional model” seems to suggest.
One legal consequence that has developed as a result of the physician-as-gatekeeper model is the learned
intermediary doctrine (the “doctrine). The doctrine places legal tort liability on the “learned intermediary”
(doctor) rather than the pharmaceutical company if harm arises out of a patient’s reliance on or use of
misinformation about a prescription drug.15 Over the years, drug manufacturers have been able to shield
themselves from consumer litigation so long as they comply with applicable label and physician disclosure
13Most of these physician-directed expenditures continue today, even as pharmaceutical companies have dramatically increased
their expenditures for DTC advertising. See infra Part IV: Drug Manufacturers, at 34.
14See generally Wayne L. Pines, A History and Perspective on Direct-to-Consumer Promotion, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 489
(1999).
15The doctrine, an eﬀective legal liability shield, is discussed in more detail infra Part IV: Drug Manufacturers, at 41.
6requirements.16 Considering the doctor’s role as an intermediary, the nature of the American medical model,
and the drug manufacturers’ reliance on the doctrine, it is easy to see why companies believed for so many
years that the most eﬃcient and eﬀective method of communicating with consumers was through their doc-
tors.
In the 1960s, when a strong consumer movement began to sweep the US, patients began to express a greater
interest in their health and in the decisions made about the treatments prescribed or recommended by their
doctors. In 1970, the FDA responded to this increase in interest by requiring drug manufacturers to include
“patient package inserts” (PPIs) in particular drug packages. 17 This requirement was an FDA response to
the growing consumer awareness of health issues, speciﬁcally consumer interest in the risks and potential side
eﬀects of prescription drugs. Despite the fact that PPIs are written in complex language, often too technical
for the average patient to understand, their introduction began a process of direct communication between
pharmaceutical companies and consumers that continued to expand during the 1970s and eventually evolved
into an expectation that information traditionally reserved for physicians be made accessible to the ordinary
consumer.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, book publishers seized on this consumer interest by successfully marketing
to consumers variations of “physician desk references,” an indication that the consumer demand for more
information was palatable.18 “The surge of interest and information in prescription drugs also stemmed from
the novelty and miracle of the drugs themselves” as more and more medications were formulated to treat
diseases for which there was no previous “cure in a bottle.”19 Growing consumer expectations, the national
enactment of consumer protection legislation, and the success of “miracle” pills precipitated the call for more
16See 21 U.S.C.A. § 352. “Both FDA’s historical practice and court decisions have reinforced the proposition that information
about prescription drugs – both indications for use and warnings about possible side eﬀects and adverse reactions – is to be
directed to physicians and other medical professionals.” Hutt & Merrill, supra note 3, at 438.
17See Pines, supra note 14, at 489.
18See id. at 490 – 91.
19Id. at 491.
7consumer-directed medical information.
However, despite this burgeoning consumer interest, pharmaceutical companies continued to market and ad-
vertise their drugs strictly to physicians throughout the 1970s.20 This decision was inﬂuenced not only by the
medical profession’s reliance on a paternalistic model of medicine and the industry’s reliance on the learned
intermediary doctrine, but also by the low level of comfort in knowing what would meet the Act’s “brief
summary” and “adequate provision” requirements. As a result, drug companies continued to direct most
of their advertising to physicians in print literature, limited medical broadcast media, and other traditional
methods of physician marketing.
In the early 1980s, this historical tide began to turn as the very ﬁrst DTC prescription drug ads were de-
veloped by Boots Pharmaceuticals (for the ibuprofen drug Rufen) and Merck (for the pneumonia vaccine
Pneumovax).21 These breakthrough ads triggered a new debate within the pharmaceutical industry, the
medical profession, and internally at the FDA as to the eﬃcacy, wisdom, and implications of advertising
prescription drugs directly to the public. In a 1982 speech at the Pharmaceutical Advertising Council, then-
FDA Commissioner Dr. Arthur Hull Hays, Jr. predicted “‘exponential growth’ in advertising directly to the
consumer,” a statement that, in the minds of the industry, was equivalent to a DTC endorsement.22 While
neither Dr. Hays nor the FDA intended “to advocate for DTC advertising, nor even to passively support
it,” the industry reacted to the remarks by ﬂooding the FDA with new proposals for DTC ads. 23
Many of the FDA’s staﬀ and physicians believed that drug ads directed at patients were “inappropriate” and
would lead to confusion and misinformation. Based on this concern, the FDA, in September 1982, asked the
pharmaceutical industry to cooperate in a voluntary moratorium on all DTC ads.24 During the moratorium,
20See id.
21Id.
22Id. at 492.
23Id.
24See Caroline L. Nadal, The Societal Value of Prescription Drug Advertisements in the New Millennium: Targeted Con-
8various interested parties (the FDA, the CBS television network, and several pharmaceutical companies)
conducted independent research on the issue of consumer education and DTC ads. Each study reported the
same basic conclusion: consumers wanted more information about prescription drugs and were heavily in
favor of DTC advertising.25 However, those at the FDA continued to feel that the tight regulation of such
ads was necessary to ensure that pharmaceutical companies provided full, rather than favorable, information
to consumers.
In September 1985, the FDA lifted the voluntary moratorium by declaring that the restrictions histori-
cally applied to physician advertisements were applicable to consumer advertisements as well.26 The notice
included the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction over consumer prescription drug ads27 and emphasized the im-
portance of fair balance and the “brief summary” of risks.28 The notice provided an exception to the brief
summary requirement in broadcast ads by allowing for the substitution of a “major statement,” but the
FDA’s continued insistence on the inclusion of “adequate provision” made it virtually impossible and too
expensive for 30-second TV ads to fulﬁll the requirements of DTC.29
As a result of this guidance, pharmaceutical companies began to market to consumers more than before,
but they continued to focus their eﬀorts primarily on print advertisements. Most of the ads were considered
“help-seeking” ads - ads that do not name a product but rather encourage the consumer to seek help by iden-
tifying a particular disorder and suggesting that patients ask their physician about available treatments.30
These ads became quite popular, and by 1989, DTC ad expenditures had risen from zero to $12 million in
little more than three years. 31 The popularity of help-seeking ads continued to grow exponentially through
sumers Become the Learned, 9 J.L. & Pol’y 451, 479 (2001).
25Pines, supra note 14, at 492.
2650 Fed. Reg. 36,677 (1985).
27While there is an argument to be made that the FTC rather than the FDA should have such jurisdiction, the two agencies
have entered into a “Memorandum of Understanding” which gives the FDA authority over prescription drug ads and gives the
FTC authority to regulate Over-the-Counter (OTC) ads. See Memorandum of Understanding, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,538 (1971).
2850 Fed. Reg. 36,677 (1985).
29Id.
30Pines, supra note 14, at 493.
31Id.
9the mid-1990s.
While the FDA continued to research the best regulatory policy for DTC advertising after lifting the mora-
torium, drug manufacturers continued to hold oﬀ on product-claim broadcast ads for fear of violating the
Act’s requirements. The industry particularly struggled with how to “fairly balance” the risk and side eﬀect
disclosure requirements with the positive promotion of the product’s beneﬁts. A temporary solution to this
“fair balance” problem was found in extending “help-seeking” ads from print to broadcast and developing
“reminder” ads “which call attention to the name of the drug product but do not include indications or dosage
recommendations for use....”32 The ﬁrst illustrations of these new approaches were seen in a help-seeking
ad for Upjohn’s hair restorer Rogaine (which provided consumers an 800 number for more information) and
a reminder ad for Schering-Plough’s Claritin (which omitted information about the purpose of the drug).33
Tamar Terzian cites three reasons pharmaceutical companies promulgated these new forms of DTC ad-
vertising before receiving more deﬁnitive regulations from the FDA: (1) the changing nature of the pa-
tient/physician relationships in the face of managed healthcare; (2) the ability to reach inaccessible patients;
and (3) increased marketplace competition and the need to market a greater number of drugs.34 However,
while the ball may have started to roll under the pressure of a changing marketplace, it remained clear that
DTC ads were still a fairly limited form of consumer healthcare information.
In 1995, a pro-DTC ad movement began to grow within the FDA’s DDMAC, with supporters hoping to
clarify the agency’s position on DTC ads and provide an outline for manufacturers to follow that would
satisfy the statutory requirements. These DTC ad supporters were initially met with resistance from then-
FDA Commissioner Dr. David Kessler who feared the ads would spark misinformation and confusion among
consumers. However, upon his departure in 1995, the pro-DTC ad initiative took hold. After a continu-
ous examination of drug advertising, its aﬀect on consumers and the prescription drug market, and after
3221 CFR 202.1(e)(2).
33Pines, supra note 14, at 494.
34Tamar V. Terzian, Direct to Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 25 Am. J. of L. & Medicine 149, 157 (1999).
10receiving numerous complaints about the vagueness of help-seeking and reminder ads, the FDA concluded
that unless DTC broadcast ads were allowed to contain more information, they were of little to no help for
consumers.
In addition to this internal pro-DTC ad movement, the FDA was under heavy pressure from the pharma-
ceutical industry and various media outlets, both of which stood to proﬁt should the FDA make broadcast
DTC ads easier for the industry to use.35 It is also possible the FDA had considered the First Amendment
problems its position on DTC advertising might face if challenged by pharmaceutical companies in court.
The result of this internal re-evaluation was a guidance that dramatically changed the way pharmaceutical
companies market their products in the US.
After issuing a temporary draft guidance in August 1997 (the “1997 draft guidance”),36 the FDA ﬁnalized
its release of the “Industry Guidance on Consumer Directed Broadcast Advertisements” in August 1999 (the
“1999 guidance”) (Appendix 1).37 “The purpose of this guidance is to describe an approach [to DTC ads]
that FDA believes can fulﬁll the requirement for adequate provision in connection with consumer-directed
broadcast advertisements for prescription drugs....”38 The guidance was designed to make it easier for
manufacturers to run product-claim advertisements that include the drug’s purpose and eﬀects while sat-
isfying the statutory requirements and public policy goals. Even after the comment period, there were no
substantial changes made to the guidance’s draft form, as research during the interim period left the FDA
“unaware of any data supporting the assertion that the public health...is being harmed, or is likely to be
35See Alexandra Marks, A harder look at prescription-drug ads, The Christian Science Monitor, April 11, 2001 at 1.
3662 Fed. Reg. 43,171 (1997).
37See Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements [hereinafter “1999 guidance”] (1999) available
at www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/1804fnl.htm (last visited April 18, 2002). By deﬁnition, a federal “guidance” only represents
an agency’s thinking on a subject at a particular moment in time; a guidance does not have the power or authority of law, nor
does it create or confer any rights or bind the agency or the public to its provisions. While the industry is warned that reliance
on a guidance will not always prove successful, it is common practice to treat a guidance as if it were a promulgated rule or
regulation.
38Id.
11harmed, by the Agency’s actions in facilitating consumer-directed broadcast advertising.”39
The 1999 guidance recommends that each of the following disclosures be made in broadcast product-claim
advertisements:
•
the ad should disclose a toll-free telephone number for customers to call and request that
approved package labeling either be sent to them by mail or read to them over the phone;
• the ad should announce the availability of packaging information in a print advertisement running con-
current with the broadcast ad and appearing in a publication that reaches an audience similar in scope to
that of the broadcast ad;
• the ad should give an Internet address at which consumers may access the approved package labeling; and
• the ad should direct the consumer to contact his or her physician or pharmacists in order to gain more
information about the advertised product.40
While the FDA’s 1999 guidance considers person-to-person telemarketing calls to be included in the “broad-
cast ad” category, it requires less disclosure because of the consumer’s apparent willingness to receive the
information (as demonstrated by taking the call). For these calls, the industry is only required to provide the
drug’s package label information to the consumer by mail or by reading it over the phone, and the marketer
must indicate that a physician or pharmacist can provide additional information should the consumer have
further questions.41
39Food and Drug Administration, Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements Questions and Answers (1999) available at
www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/index.htm (last visited April 18, 2002).
40Id.
41Id.
12Upon issuance of the draft guidance in 1997, Nancy Ostrove, Ph.D., a former DDMAC public health analyst
and FDA DTC expert,42 characterized the new approach as in the public’s best interest, stating that “[b]y
indicating how drug companies can ensure that consumers have convenient access to detailed product risk
information, the new guidance should encourage ads that provide more speciﬁc information and promote
consumer awareness of prescription drugs and their uses.”43 Ostrove promised the guidance was only “the
ﬁrst step of an intensive [FDA] review of concerns about the value of requiring extensive detailing of product
risk information” in DTC ads.44 To that end, the announcement of the 1999 guidance included a promise
to study its provisions and the eﬀects of DTC ads within two years. The results of this benchmark study,
conducted in the Fall of 2001, are anticipated in late Spring of 2002.45
In April 2001, the FDA solicited comment on a proposed new guidance allowing “the use [of] certain FDA-
approved patient labeling to fulﬁll the requirement that prescription drug...advertisements directed toward
consumers (DTC) in print media contain adequate risk disclosure.”46 The new guidance provides that patient
package labeling, when used word-for-word in print ads, satisﬁes the brief summary requirement if the ad
includes the following: (1) contraindications; (2) warnings; (3) major precautions; and (4) other frequently
occurring side eﬀects that are likely to be drug-related.47 The pharmaceutical industry has responded posi-
tively to the proposed new guidance, and it seems likely some form of the draft will be accepted in the year
2002.
42Nancy Ostrove left her position at the FDA’s DDMAC in March 2002 for a position with the pharma-
ceutical company Eli Lilly. DDMAC’s Ostrove Goes to Industry, DTC Perspectives (March 29, 2002) at
http://www.dtcperspectives.com/content.asp?id=53 (last visited April 18, 2002).
43Nancy M. Ostrove, Ph.D., More understandable TV ads of Rx drugs on way, News Along the Pike, (FDA Interagency
Newsletter) at 1, 11 (August 1997).
44Id. at 11.
45FDA DTC Study Eagerly Anticipated, DTC Perspectives (March 29, 2002) at
http://www.dtcperspectives.com/content.asp?id=52 (last visited April 18, 2002).
46Guidance for Industry: Using FDA-Approved Patient Labeling in Consumer-Directed Print Advertisements [hereinafter
“New Guidance”] (2001) (proposed March 2001) available at www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/4114dft.htm (last visited April 18,
2002).
47See id.
13To enforce the pharmaceutical industry’s compliance with the statute as interpreted by FDA in the 1999
guidance, the DDMAC has developed a DTC ad review procedure (Appendix 2).48 This compliance review
process may be initiated by any of three events:
•
the applicant (manufacturer of the product) may request a review of either the product
launch promotional materials or other communications;
•
FDA/DDMAC oﬃcials may conduct surveillance and determine when particular communi-
cations need to be reviewed; or
•
a complaint may be ﬁled by an interested party (including members of the industry, com-
petitors, health professionals, consumers or others) with regard to a particular product’s communi-
cations.49
The review process begins by assigning the request to the DDMAC reviewer responsible for that product
or product class. The reviewer exercises his or her discretion in the initial fact ﬁnding and may choose to
consult with one or all of the following: the DDMAC consultant on DTC advertising issues (a single FDA
employee that consults on all compliance reviews to ensure consistency), a pharmaeconomics/managed care
consultant, a medical consultant, or a statistical consultant from the FDA’s CDER.50 The reviewer may look
48Food and Drug Administration, Promotional Material Review Process, available at
www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/complain.htm (last visited April 18, 2002).
50Food and Drug Administration, Consultation, available at www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/prconsul.htm (last visited April
14to a product’s previous promotional pieces or those of competing products and may request more information
from the applicant or entity under review. After completing his or her investigation, the reviewer may choose
whether to end the review by sending a “launch letter” to the applicant, eﬀectively signaling a continuance
of the ad campaign, or may present the matter at an “enforcement rounds” session, a weekly meeting of
DDMAC oﬃcials to discuss enforcement issues. After rounds, the reviewer may re-visit the information,
request additional information from the applicant, determine that no action is required, or may choose a
method of enforcement.51
Enforcement of the 1999 guidance usually comes in the form of a “warning letter” that is sent to the
manufacturer as notice that DDMAC considers a promotional piece to be in violation of the law. The letter
gives the company 15 days to respond, and if prompt and appropriate measures are not taken, DDMAC
promises further action without prior notiﬁcation.52 For less serious violations, a reviewer may choose to
send an “untitled letter” that requests a speciﬁc action be taken in order to bring the ad into compliance
with the Act’s requirements.53 Other available methods of enforcement, those that the FDA is generally
authorized to employ include seizure, injunction, or criminal prosecution.54 To date, none of these more
serious enforcement means have been used against DTC ad violations.
In the years since the guidance was released, the number of warning letters issued for non-compliance has
signiﬁcantly decreased. From August 1997 to August 1998, DDMAC issued 18 enforcement letters for more
than half of the 35 products promoted by DTC broadcast ads.55 However, the number of products subject
18, 2002).
51FDA, Promotional Material Review Process, supra note 48.
52Food and Drug Administration, Warning Letter, available at www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/prwarlet.htm (last visited April
18, 2002).
53Food and Drug Administration, Untitled Letter, available at www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/pruntlet.htm (last visited April
18, 2002).
5421 U.S.C.A. § 331 – 37.
55Pines, supra note 14, at 502.
15to enforcement began to decrease in 1999, and in 2001, DDMAC only issued 13 letters, a small number in
comparison to the number of prescription drugs currently advertised by DTC ads.56
There are several possible explanations for this decrease in enforcement: (1) that the industry’s increasing
familiarity with the guidance and FDA expectations has led to fewer violations; (2) that the increased use by
pharmaceutical companies of the voluntary pre-market approval process increases compliance; or (3) that the
DDMAC has relaxed its discretionary review of DTC promotional materials. According to Nancy Ostrove,
any measurable decline in FDA enforcement is most likely due to personnel turnover and/or the growing
number of pre-launch reviews the agency conducts at the request of pharmaceutical companies.57
However, some have argued that the decline in enforcement is actually due to budgetary constraints; that
DDMAC cannot eﬀectively enforce the regulations because it has not been given the resources it needs to
keep up with the exploding growth of DTC ads. According to Dr. Sidney Wolfe of Public Citizen, “[t]he only
plausible explanation for this dangerous decrease is that the police force DDMAC has not been strong enough
in numbers of investigators along with a lack of adequate pro-enforcement leadership from top oﬃcials in
FDA.”58 Wolfe suggests expanding the FDA’s authority to assess monetary ﬁnes for DTC ad violations,
stating that such action “might actually serve as a deterrent for companies who now just stop the violative
ad when requested by the FDA, then create and massively disseminate a new one shortly thereafter.”59
While no one disputes the fact that enforcement actions have decreased, the FDA has continued to actively
monitor DTC ads by accepting complaints and requests for compliance reviews from all interested parties.
As recently as January 9, 2002, the pharmaceutical company Hoﬀman – La Roche was warned about a
series of print and telephone broadcast ads that were misleading and lacked adequate provision. 60 The ads,
56Food and Drug Administration, Warning Letters and Notice of Violation Letters to Pharmaceutical Companies,” available
at http://www.fda.gov/cder/warn/index.htm (last visited April 15, 2002).
57Direct to Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Aﬀairs, Foreign Commerce,
and Tourism Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2001).
58Id.
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60See Letter from Joseph A. Grillo, Regulatory Review Oﬃcer, DDMAC at FDA, to Mr. Murad Husain, Program Director,
16which advertised the prescription drug Xeolda, an oral chemotherapy for colorectal cancer, were subsequently
pulled by the company.
As consumers become more complacent toward DTC advertisements, it is possible the ads will begin to lose
their eﬀectiveness or their ability to grab a viewer’s attention. If that happens, advertisers and manufacturers
will be forced to ﬁnd new ways of capturing the audience, perhaps pushing the envelope on the claims made
in DTC ads. If this happens, it will be up to DDMAC to recognize the shift, and it will be up to the FDA to
dedicate the resources necessary to ensure that the public is protected by the enforced compliance of DTC
ad restrictions.
IV. EFFECT OF DTC ADVERTISING ON VARIOUS INTEREST GROUPS
DTC advertising aﬀects the interests and policies of a number of various groups: consumers, pharmaceutical
companies and their shareholders, physicians and other medical providers, broadcast and print media, health
management organizations, health insurers, and both the federal and state government. Each of these groups
has a stake in the use and regulation of DTC ads, and each has a diﬀerent perspective on the pros and cons
of the drug marketing technique. In order to truly assess the value and eﬃcacy of the FDA’s policy and
DTC ads themselves, the issue should be examined from the points of view of all aﬀected parties.
PATIENTS AND CONSUMERS
Drug Regulatory Aﬀairs, Hoﬀman – La Roche, (Jan. 9, 2002) available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/warn/2002/10521.pdf
(last visited April 15, 2002).
17For the average consumer, it is diﬃcult to remember what television commercial breaks were like before the
FDA’s 1997 draft guidance. DTC ads have become such an integral part of modern American culture that
the mere mention of a prescription drug’s name can trigger the mind to hear a catchy jingle, a catch phrase,
or to see a familiar celebrity discussing their favorite medication.
But do DTC ads trigger more than the sounds and images of clever marketing? Do consumers retain any
of the pertinent health information the ads provide, such as the drug’s beneﬁts, risks, or the condition it
purports to treat? Surveys indicate that they do, and they remember these facts in remarkable numbers.
“Prior to these ads, prescription drugs were a mystery with names we couldn’t pronounce and side eﬀects we
didn’t even try to understand. Today, consumers know the drugs they are taking, any potential side eﬀects,
even how they interact with other drugs.”61 This heightened awareness of drugs can be partially attributed
to the promulgation of DTC ads.
The primary argument made in support of DTC ads, an argument often made by prescription drug man-
ufacturers and the FDA, is that they enable patients to exercise control over their own medical care by
making them informed participants in healthcare decisions. The ads educate consumers about disorders of
which they may have otherwise been unaware. Based on the results of several statistical studies, all of which
indicate high consumer approval and retention of DTC ad information, it appears most consumers agree
with this basic pro-DTC argument.
In November 2001, the Kaiser Family Foundation released the results of a survey in which over 1,800 people
61Recent Developments which may impact Consumer Access to, and Demand for, Pharmaceuticals Hearing Before the Sub-
committee on House of Representatives Health of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 15 (2001) (statement
of Rep. Anna G. Ashoo).
18were questioned about the eﬀect of DTC advertising on consumer behavior.62 The survey sample was bro-
ken into two groups: viewers and non-viewers of prescription drug television advertisements.63 The study
concluded that nearly 30% of Americans have acted upon information gained directly from a DTC ad, and
that of that 30%, one in two was prescribed a particular medication after approaching their doctor with
questions.64 While the majority of the survey’s DTC ad viewers reported “not learning” anything from
the ads, they actually gave more correct responses than non-viewers when questioned about the details of
the advertised drugs.65 When asked how well they believe DTC ads disclose information about a drug’s
treatable condition or beneﬁts, a high percentage of consumers rated the ads as “good or excellent.” Only
half believed the ads were successful in relating the potential side eﬀects or dosage for the medication.66
Those who oppose DTC advertising argue that consumers only retain information about the beneﬁts of a
drug and ignore information about risks or side eﬀects. However, that claim is countered by the results of a
1999 FDA consumer/patient survey, results which were completed with the release of the 1999 guidance.67
The survey, which focused on respondents who had seen a physician within the previous three months,
indicated a 72% general recall level for information about products promoted with DTC ads. Eighty two
percent of those who could recall only “some information” were able to recall the drug’s risks, while 87% of
those same patients were able to recall the drug’s beneﬁts. In print ads, 85% of respondents said they read
62The Kaiser Family Foundation, Understanding the Eﬀects of Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising (November
2001) available at http://www.kff.org/content/2001/20011129a/ (last visited April 18, 2002). The Kaiser Family Foundation
is not aﬃliated with the pharmaceutical company Kaiser-Permanente.
63Id.
64Id.
65Id.
66Id.
67Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Division of Drug
Marketing, Advertising, and Communications, Attitudes and behaviors associated with
direct-to-consumer (DTC) promotion of prescription drugs: main survey results (1999) available at
www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac/dtcindex.htm (last visited April 16, 2002).
19all or almost all of the ad content if the ad was for a drug in which they were particularly interested.68 This
report of high consumer recall levels seems to answer many of the “poor information” arguments made by
those who oppose the use of DTC advertising.
On the issue of consumer behavior, the FDA survey found that 27% of the patient respondents were prompted
by a DTC ad to consult their doctor about a condition they had not previously discussed.69 Half of those
surveyed said they took other forms of action, usually by seeking additional information through product
hotlines, magazine ads, or other sources. Eighty six percent of respondents said DTC ads helped to make
them aware of new drugs, and 33% said that DTC ads had reminded them to reﬁll their existing prescriptions
on time, a spillover eﬀect that DTC advocates often point out.70
In addition to statistical surveys, a number of independent studies have indicated resolute consumer satisfac-
tion with the growth of DTC ads. In January 2002, the National Health Council (NHC), a group comprised
of volunteer health agencies, nonproﬁt organizations, professional associations, and healthcare businesses,
released a report and position paper on DTC ads that endorses the practice as a consumer information
device and approves of the current guidance structure.71 The paper called on the FDA to continue its
research into the eﬀects of DTC promotion, stating that “[b]oth the beneﬁts and concerns related to DTC
advertising deserve further thoughtful study in such areas as consumer perceptions and comprehension, the
patient-doctor relationship, the impact on health outcomes, and the impact on health care costs based on
integrated data and across components of care.” 72 The NHC also urged the FDA to maintain a high level
68Id.
69Id.
70Id. For more on the pro-DTC ad “spillover eﬀect” argument, see John E. Calfee, What Consumer Surveys Show about
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs (American Enterprise Institute) (May 7, 2001) at 18.
71See The National Health Council, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising: Overview and Recommendations
(January 2002) available at www.nationalhealthcouncil.org/advocacy/dtc.htm (last visited April 16, 2002). It is important
to note that this study was funded in part by Pﬁzer, a leading pharmaceutical company and member of the National Health
Council.
72The National Health Council, National Health Council Statement: Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising
(January 2002), available at http://www.nationalhealthcouncil.org/advocacy/dtc.htm (last visited April 16, 2002).
20of oversight and enforcement under the terms of the current guidance.
At the conclusion of its 1999 consumer survey, the FDA stated that it was unaware of any support for
the proposition that “public health...is being harmed, or is likely to be harmed, by the [FDA’s] actions
in facilitating consumer-directed broadcast advertising.”73 However, not everyone agrees with this positive
assessment of DTC promotion. As important as it is to consider what DTC ads say to consumers, it is
equally important to consider what the ads do not say and the possible impact that such omissions may
have. As Rep. Sherrod Brown (D-OH) noted during a recent House Health Subcommittee hearing, “[t]here
are questions whether DTC ads fairly represent their products. It’s certain they don’t highlight the relative
price of their product and how that relates to its eﬃcacy. My guess is that if consumers had the full picture,
DTC ads would be much less [successful] than they are today.”74
An article by Dr. Sidney Wolfe of Public Citizen which appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine
argues that the “marketing” information consumers receive in DTC ads is not the type of information that
will empower them to participate in or take charge of their healthcare.75 Wolfe states that “confusion arises
when commercially driven promotional information is represented as educational,” and he calls for stronger
regulation by the FDA to ensure that ads contain more useful information and less “sales” material.76
In response to Dr. Wolfe’s article, Alan Holmer, president of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufac-
turers of America (PhRMA), returns to the “informed patient” argument. He states that DTC advertising
has played an important role in strengthening the healthcare system in favor of the informed patient, and
that the true purpose of DTC promotion is realized when the ads facilitate a two-way conversation between
doctor and patient. 77 “Such discussions are beneﬁcial — to the patient, who gains a better understanding
73Id. at Appendix B7.
74Recent Developments which may impact Consumer Access to, and Demand for, Pharmaceuticals Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on House of Representatives Health of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 5 (2001) (statement
of Rep. Sherrod Brown).
75Sidney M. Wolfe, MD, Editorial: Direct to Consumer Advertising – Education or Emotion Promotion?, 346 new England
Journal of Medicine 524 (2002).
76Id.
77Alan J. Holmer, JD, Direct to Consumer Advertising – Strengthening our Health Care System, 346 new England Journal
21of the physician’s recommendation for treatment, and to the physician, who gains a better understanding of
the patient’s needs.”78
Despite the industry’s argument that DTC ads produce better informed patients, Public Citizen and other
consumer organizations have repeatedly called on the FDA to increase its funding for more eﬃcient DDMAC
enforcement, to lobby Congress for the authority to enforce monetary penalties, and to address what Public
Citizen perceives as a growing problem of patient misinformation caused by DTC promotion.79 Wolfe sees
the promulgation of DTC ads as a direct threat to the most vulnerable consumers in the viewing audience:
elderly patients.
In addition to Public Citizen, the National Consumers League (NCL) has expressed a concern that the
FDA has inaccurately characterized the “information” in commercial advertisements as a positive, eﬀective
method of communication with patients. The NCL comment to the FDA’s 2001 proposed new guidance
included a summary of the organization’s “Stakeholder Roundtable” events at which interested parties met
to discuss DTC promotion. The participants at these events concluded that DTC advertising, in its current
form, is an ineﬀective method of communicating risks to viewers and does not contain information that
usefully contributes to patient participation in healthcare.80 While NCL agrees with the FDA that DTC ads
could be helpful tools in empowering consumers, the group believes that the current regulatory approach
does not go far enough to ensure that only accurate information and full risk disclosures are presented in
every DTC ad.81 NCL proposes that “the format for presenting risk information for prescription drugs be
of Medicine 526 (2002).
78Id.
79See Wolfe, supra note 75.
80See Letter from National Consumers League to FDA (July 19, 2001) (on ﬁle with the author).
81See id.
22standardized, as it is for over-the-counter drugs, dietary supplements and foods.”82 They believe that a
mandatory form of risk disclosure would more eﬃciently realize the potential beneﬁts of DTC advertising.
Despite the overwhelming popularity of DTC ads among the general public, and aside from concerns ex-
pressed by consumer advocates as to the eﬃciency of DTC ads, a growing number of consumer advocacy
groups express another objection: cost. These groups believe that DTC advertising harms the average con-
sumer not only because of misinformation or partial disclosures but because they correlate the cost of DTC
advertising with the rising cost of healthcare in America.83 The pharmaceutical industry disputes any such
correlation.
It is diﬃcult to truly understand the impact DTC advertising has on consumers by reviewing this cate-
gory of stakeholders in isolation. While consumers may feel as though they are empowered by DTC ads,
as most statistical studies clearly suggest, an important indication of their ultimate eﬀect may depend on
how this “empowerment” translates from the living room to the exam room. How do DTC ads aﬀect the
patient/physician relationship, and are such eﬀects really in the patient’s best interest?
THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
The 1999 FDA guidance opened up a whole new world to patients and their medical providers – one in
which a patient questions the doctor about a particular prescription drug, questions a nurse about a partic-
ular disorder, or inquires at the pharmacy as to why they aren’t taking the drug advertised on TV as “the
best” treatment available. Doctors and other medical professionals are being faced with patient demands
82Id. at 3.
83For more on the debate over the rising cost of prescription drugs, see infra Part IV: Drug Manufacturers, at .
23for particular prescription drugs popularized in DTC ads, drugs that sometimes cost twice as much as an
alternative generic treatment or that treat a disease the patient does not have. The impact of DTC on
the patient/physician relationship is one of the most volatile battlegrounds of the entire DTC issue, with
many physicians claiming that this form of advertising strains their credibility with patients and reduces the
position of authority they have been aﬀorded under the traditional American healthcare model.84
Historically, patients looked to their doctors for all the advice and information they needed about their
health, their disease, and any possible “cure.” Today, the physician’s role has been changed by a new med-
ical system in which intermediaries (such as HMOs) facilitate the doctor/patient relationship, and health
information is available at the consumer’s ﬁngertips. Physicians are no longer the primary resource for
patients; rather, they are a bit further down a long list of informational tools. Based on these changes, it is
not surprising that physicians and physician groups have been some of the most outspoken DTC ad critics.
Studies have shown that DTC ads clearly aﬀect patient behavior as patients consistently report questioning
their doctors about prescription drugs to which they have been introduced on TV. It is estimated that 30%
of Americans have approached their doctor about a DTC promoted drug at some point in the past ﬁve
years.85 Respondents to the 1999 FDA study reported that when they acted on information learned in a
DTC ad (51%), 81% sought that information from their doctor.86
Consumer respondents to the FDA study believe that DTC advertising has had a positive impact on their
own doctor/patient relationships.87 Of those consumers surveyed who had visited a doctor in the previous
three months, 81% believed their doctor welcomed questions about products seen on DTC ads, 71% stated
the doctor treated their question as a routine part of the visit, and 79% reported that their doctor followed
their questions with a conversation about the drug.88 Sixty two percent of respondents agreed that DTC
84See NHC, Overview and Recommendations, supra note 71, at 7.
85Kaiser, DTC Survey Chartpack, supra note 62, at 4.
86FDA, supra note 67.
87Id.
88Id.
24ads have facilitated better communication with their physicians.89
With so much consumer support for the impact DTC has had on the doctor/patient relationship, it seems
diﬃcult at ﬁrst blush to see a problem. However, many medical professionals believe that some doctors
are in fact pressured by these patient inquiries and that DTC ads may have a negative eﬀect on physician
prescribing behaviors.90 “A recent study in New Zealand and the United States, the only two countries
where DTC advertising is permitted, showed that 90% of doctors felt pressured to prescribe medications
that consumers requested, 80% assented to their patients requests for certain drugs, and 31% prescribed
drugs that were not their ﬁrst choice. Physicians assent to patients demands for speciﬁc drugs because they
cannot aﬀord to lose patients in the modern managed care regime.”91 Other physicians express concern
over the loss of faith and trust that some patients may experience should their physician not prescribe a
medication in which the patient has become interested after watching and reading various DTC ads.92
There is anecdotal evidence to support this notion of physician dissatisfaction with DTC ads. One doctor
complains that patients are requesting prescription drugs they don’t need. “It used to be...that patients
would feel an oﬃce visit wasn’t complete without them walking out with an Rx. Now they’re walking into
oﬃces and asking their physicians, ‘How come I’m not on Claritin?’ Well, how about because you don’t have
an allergy?”93 However, it is possible that, as patients become less enamored with DTC ads and physicians
become more comfortable with patient inquiries, doctors will begin to soften their criticism over this form
of marketing.
A recent survey by Louis Harris Interactives and the Harvard University School of Public Health found
that a growing number of doctors accept the beneﬁts of DTC advertising. The report states that “initially
89Id.
90See Spurgeon D., Doctors feel pressured by direct to consumer advertising, 319 British Med. J. 1321 (1999).
91Yonni D. Fushman, Case Comment: Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc.: Toward Creating a Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
Exception to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 80 B.U.L. Rev. 1161, 1172 (2000).
92See Anne B. Brown, The direct-to-consumer advertising dilemma; prescription medication advertising, 35 Patient Care
22 (2001).
93Robert McCarthy, PhD, Rx Ads hit Consumer Bull’s Eye, 10 Drug Benefit Trends 23 (1998) available at
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/416807 (last visited April 18, 2002).
25there was a sense of outrage among physicians...and a feeling that only they should talk to patients about
prescription drugs,” but that doctors are recognizing the possibilities of DTC in growing numbers.94 The
Harris/Harvard poll reported that 49% of the physicians surveyed believed DTC had helped “educate and
inform” patients, and 25% believed the ads had aﬀected patient compliance with prescriptions they already
used.95 While these numbers do not suggest overwhelming physician support for DTC ads, they may reﬂect
a growing trend of familiarity and acceptance of DTC promotion.
The physician‘s role as an information and prescription drug gatekeeper is often seen as the ultimate pro-
tection against consumer harms caused by DTC ads. However, this protection only works if the gatekeeper
maintains a steady watch. Dr. Sidney Wolfe recently questioned this traditional DTC ad defense by stating
that “duped gatekeepers may not adequately resist patients’ exhortations to write a prescription.”96 In re-
sponse to changes in patient behavior, and to ensure physicians fulﬁll their role as the ultimate gatekeepers,
a number of physician organizations have issued guidelines for physician response to patient inquiries about
DTC promoted drugs.
For example, the American Medical Association (AMA) Council on Ethical and Judicial Aﬀairs advises that,
“[w]hen confronted with the inﬂuences of advertising, physicians should maintain professional standards of
informed consent by denying requests for inappropriate prescriptions, educating patients as to why certain
advertised drugs may not be suitable treatment options, and including, when appropriate, information on
the cost eﬀectiveness of prescription drug options.”97 The Council set forth the following guidelines for all
physicians to follow:
(1) Work with the FDA to ensure eﬀective policies and standards;
94Pharmaceutical Researchers and Manufacturers of America, Backgrounders and Facts: Direct to Consumer Advertising
(2000) at http://www.phrma.org/publications/backgrounders/other/dtc.phtml (last visited April 18, 2002).
95Id.
96Wolfe, supra note 75, at 525.
97The Council on Ethical and Judicial Aﬀairs of the American Medical Association, Direct to Consumer Advertisements of
Prescription Drugs, 55 Food & Drug L.J. 119 (2000).
26(2) encourage studies on the impact DTC ads have on patient healthcare;
(3) maintain professional standards of informed consent when prescribing drugs after receiving a
patient inquiry related to a DTC ad; and
(4) ensure that DTC advertising does not promote false expectations of any particular prescription
drug.98
The Council encouraged physicians to report any misleading advertisements to the FDA and to actively
evaluate their own experiences with patients and DTC ads to ensure that patient health always comes
ﬁrst.99
Medical organizations have not only advised their membership on how to respond to DTC ad inquires, but
they have advised the FDA as to their opinions of the current DTC ad regulations and their suggestions
for possible DTC ad reform. Prior to the 1997 draft guidance, the AMA developed a set of standards by
which it believed DTC ads should be regulated. The organization’s comment to the 1997 draft guidance
expressed concern over the possibility that an “adverse impact...on the patient-physician relationship and
the potential for negative public health and economic outcomes” might occur.100 In a 1999 report by the
AMA’s Board of Trustees, the organization clariﬁed its position on DTC ads by reconﬁrming the standards
it developed in 1997 and calling for the continued assessment of DTC ads and their impact on consumer
healthcare. The AMA requested that the FDA continuously research the eﬀects and beneﬁts of DTC, and
it asked that its own standards be incorporated into the FDA’s regulatory regime (a request that was not
honored).101 The AMA urged strict enforcement of DTC ad regulations and encouraged the pharmaceutical
99Id.
100Memorandum from AMA Board of Trustees to Reference Committee E, Report of the Board of Trustees, B of T Report
38 –A-99, at 3 (1999).
101Id.
27industry to update its research as to the eﬀect DTC ads have on the physician/patient relationship.102 While
the AMA position could be characterized as somewhat cautious, it serves as an important endorsement of
DTC ads in the prescription drug trade.
The American College of Physicians – American Society of Internal Medicine (ACP-ASIM) has taken a more
critical position on DTC ads, suggesting that the FDA pre-screen all DTC ads rather than rely on post-hoc
complaints or requests for review.103 Doctors aﬃliated with the group complain that the current FDA review
system is too lenient and must be revised to ensure that patients receive only the highest quality of balanced,
fair information.104 The ACP-ASIM disputes reports which suggest that DTC advertising has resulted in
more patient visits to see their doctors. The organization believes that higher prescription levels, which are
in fact quantiﬁable, do not necessarily indicate a higher number of doctor visits since patients can call in
for prescriptions or order drugs oﬀ of the Internet.105 The ACP-ASIM argues that the dangerous nature
of such practices, including the possibility that some patients purchase prescription drugs for self-diagnosed
symptoms when they actually suﬀer from more serious conditions, must be considered when developing DTC
ad regulations.106
The American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP) issued a statement in 1999 arguing that DTC ads
are appropriate only when they comply with FDA regulations, the information is accurate, balanced and
objective, the ad adequately highlights adverse reactions and side eﬀects, and the consumer is clearly urged
to seek consultation with a physician.107 The organization also stressed that, “if advertisements direct the
consumer to a physician, referral should be to the consumer’s personal physician,” rather than a doctor
102See AMA Report of Council on Medical Service, Report No. 9: Costs and Beneﬁts of Pharmaceutical Use in the United
States (1999) at www.ama-assn.org/meetings/public/interim99/downloads/cmsrep.pdf.
103Facing oﬀ: Prescription Pitches, The NY Times, August 21, 2001, at F7. For a discussion into why this suggestion violates
the Constitution, see infra Part IV: Advertisers and the Media, at 56.
104Id.
105American College of Physicians – American Society of Internal Medicine, Direct to Consumer Advertising for Prescription
Drugs (1998) at www.acponline.org/hpp/pospaper/dtcads.htm (last visited April 16, 2002).
106Id.
107American Academy of Family Practitioners, Proprietary Practices: AAFP Policies and Positions related to Proprietary
Practices (1999) at http://www.aafp.org/policy/x1794.xml (last visited April 16, 2002).
28referred by the advertisement or the pharmaceutical company.108
Pharmacists, much like physicians, have been placed in a somewhat precarious situation as a result of higher
consumer awareness of brand name prescription drugs, often confronted with questions about a drug the
patient has seen advertised. However, pharmacists are not the prescribing professional and can thus refer
these inquiries to the patient’s doctor. As time passes and heavily advertised prescription drugs begin moving
to the OTC shelves,109 pharmacists may face a new wave of questions from consumers about the eﬃcacy
and expense of highly popular and often more expensive drugs.
It is likely, due to the heightened concerns over the cost of drugs in America, that pharmacists will be asked
by the FDA or Congress to step up their role as patient advisors. Pharmacists must be prepared to face
many of the same questions doctors are ﬁnding so diﬃcult today – questions about expensive drugs that
are made popular by advertisements but are often no more eﬀective than similar, less expensive medication.
However, this “challenge” is a familiar one for experienced pharmacists who have always faced questions
about OTC drugs and newly switched prescription medications. The only diﬀerence DTC marketing makes
for these professionals is the increase in consumer awareness of particular name brands. The pharmacists’
traditional role as a patient advisor makes them particularly well suited to accurately answer consumer
questions and eﬀectively assist the physician in balancing the eﬀects of high name recognition and inﬂuential
DTC advertising.
As the medical community and consumers become more familiar with and complacent toward DTC ads,
and as changes continue to occur in doctor/patient relationships, it is likely that the negative reaction
most doctors initially had toward DTC ads will fade. However, any increase in physician comfort may be
conditioned on the perception that the FDA will continue to ensure, through research and strict enforcement,
that DTC ads fairly present both the beneﬁts and the risks of heavily promoted prescription drugs.
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29DRUG MANUFACTURERS
The introduction of the FDA guidance that ensured compliance with broadcast DTC ad regulations was
a real turning point for the prescription drug industry. These manufacturers and their shareholders have
been clear winners in the inﬂux of DTC advertising, and so far, the companies have found a friend in their
traditional adversary, the FDA. The agency’s research and the statements of its leadership have continued to
support the use of DTC ads because, according to Dr. Janet Woodcock, director of the FDA’s CDER, the
agency has recognized that even though DTC ads are driven by commercial goals, they “have the potential to
increase awareness among consumers and patients of...conditions and the availability of treatment.”110 This
faith in the beneﬁt of DTC advertising has resulted in a cooperative enforcement relationship between the
FDA and pharmaceutical companies, a relationship in which the companies have thrived. Will the successes
of DTC ads continue to grow, or was the marketing boom of the late 1990s a limited chance to make the
most out of a “gift” from the FDA?
Immediately following the release of the 1997 draft guidance, the pharmaceutical industry began to invest
heavily in DTC ad eﬀorts. In 1997, the industry spent a total of $1.07 billion on DTC marketing, an increase
of 35.3% over the 1996 expenditure of $791 million.111 That ﬁgure rose to $1.32 billion in 1998 and $1.85
billion in 1999. In the year 2000, pharmaceutical companies spent $2.5 billion on direct-to-consumer ads for
prescription drugs.112 Of that $2.5 billion, TV ads accounted for $1.4 billion, the largest portion (57%) and
an increase of 27.3% over the industry’s 1999 TV expenditures.113
To place these DTC ad expenses in context, it should be noted that they represent a relatively small per-
110Recent Developments which may impact Consumer Access to, and Demand for, Pharmaceuticals Hearing Before the Sub-
committee on House of Representatives Health of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 34 (2001) (statement
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30centage of most pharmaceutical companies’ marketing budgets. For example, in 2000, a total of $15.7 billion
was spent on marketing prescription drugs, the majority on doctor promotions and only 16% on DTC.114
However, if the retail value of the drug samples provided to doctors is reduced to the drug company’s actual
cost value, DTC ads account for a higher, and perhaps more accurate, 31.8% of the industry’s total mar-
keting budget.115 While DTC is not the leading marketing tool for pharmaceuticals, it does account for the
most signiﬁcant portion of most companies’ advertising budgets.
Despite the extraordinary advertising expenditures by drug manufacturers, the shareholders of these phar-
maceutical corporations have had nothing to complain about. In 2000, industry wide sales of the 50 most
heavily promoted prescription drugs brought in $41.3 billion, a 31.9% increase over 1999 sales ﬁgures; in
comparison, total sales for all prescription drugs yielded $131.9 billion, an increase of only 13% over 1999.116
This data indicates that DTC marketing works. Since 1997, similar increases in sales have raised both the
revenues of pharmaceutical companies and their stock prices.
However, despite these past successes, the long term economic beneﬁts of DTC marketing are beginning to
come into question. “The sales growth of 8 of the 10 most heavily advertised drugs, nearly all of which
have annual sales of more than $1 billion, slowed in the third quarter of 2001, compared with the period in
2000...,”117 and for the ﬁrst time in recent memory, some drug companies announced zero growth for the
Fourth Quarter of 2001.118 As a result, Wall Street lowered share prices by an average of 18% in 2001, and
the S&P Index declined13 % for the eight largest drug manufacturers.119 It is possible that these downturns
were simply the result of the general market decline in late 2001. However, it should be considered that,
along with an overall slowdown in the market, lower sales ﬁgures for the most heavily promoted prescription
114Id. at 6.
115Id.
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31drugs could be due in part to the declining impact and eﬀectiveness of DTC advertising.
The phenomenal success of DTC ads over the past ﬁve years has been realized primarily by the large phar-
maceutical companies – companies with a bevy of established products and available capital to spend on
advertising campaigns. Due to the high cost of running a successful DTC campaign, small drug manufac-
turers, including one-product start up ventures, cannot initially aﬀord to compete with the name brands
that DTC ads have made so popular. For example, Sepracor Inc., a small New England drug maker, has
been readying a launch for Soltara, its version of a non-sedating antihistamine. In order to make it, Soltara
will have to compete in the most competitive drug market today – antihistamines – and against such phar-
maceutical giants as Schering-Plough’s Clarinex, Pﬁzer’s Zyrtec, and Aventis’ Allegra.120 While Sepracor’s
executives have faith that the product’s eﬀectiveness will eventually sell itself, they must ﬁrst overcome the
market saturation and name brand familiarity its competitors currently enjoy. 121
According to Robert Hazlett, a pharmaceutical market research analyst for Robertson Stephens, this task
is not impossible. He cites Allegra’s 16% market share gain in just one year as proof that a comprehensive
DTC campaign, accompanied by customer dissatisfaction with competing products, makes it possible.122 The
problem for small pharmaceutical manufacturers is that such large-scale advertising requires a tremendous
investment of front-loaded capital – money that is usually available only to large pharmaceutical companies
with proven records of success. This hurdle presents the dangerous possibility that innovation and devel-
opment by small research ﬁrms may be discouraged due to the costs associated with any proﬁt realization
120Naomi Aoki, A challenge that’s not to be sneezed at: Its new allergy drug will pit tiny Sepracor against goliaths, The
Boston Globe, January 9, 2002, at C1.
121Id. at C4.
122Id.
32from a resulting product.
The most recent debate over the pharmaceutical industry’s use of DTC advertising involves the growing
perception that the money drug companies spend on DTC ads contributes directly to the rising cost of
pharmaceutical drugs. That drug prices have increased over the past ten years is an undisputed fact – it is
the source of that increase that is of interest to a variety of groups, including consumer advocates, members
of Congress, and particularly the third party payers who are often stuck with the bill for higher prescription
drug costs.
A report by the Kaiser Family Foundation found that “manufacturer price increases have contributed a
growing proportion of the total rise in prescription drug spending - 19% from 1993-1997, and 24% from
1997-2000.”123 In a 1999 report, the Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) forecast a continued
increase in prescription drugs expenditures, higher health insurance premiums, and more consumer spending
over the next ten years.124 HIAA cited several contributing factors to higher drug costs, including faster
FDA approval of expensive treatments, higher demand for expensive medication due to the growth in third-
party payment, and the aging of Americans. However, HIAA stated that, in its opinion, the most signiﬁcant
contributing factor to higher drug prices was “the expansion of DTC advertising.”125
The pharmaceutical industry and other supporters of DTC strongly dispute any suggestion that the increase
123Kaiser Family Foundation, News Release: Survey: Nearly One in Three Adults has Talked to a Doctor and
One in Eight has Received a Prescription in Response to a Drug Ad (November 29, 2001) at 2, available at
www.kff.org/content/2001/20011129a/Release%20Final.pdf (last visited April 16, 2002).
124Brown, supra note 92, at 22.
125Id.
33in DTC ad expenditures is contributing to the rising cost of prescription drugs. In 2001, Dr. Richard
Manning and Dr. Alison Keith issued a report which found no causal connection between consumer drug
costs and pharmaceutical ad budgets. 126 While the report admits the possibility that DTC advertising
has increased the use of prescription drugs, Manning and Keith draw a clear distinction between use and
price. The report explained that “there is no theoretical reason to expect that advertising will cause higher
prices. While advertising presumably will increase demand for a product, the cost of that advertising would
usually be recouped through increased sales volume rather than through higher prices.”127 The report also
argues that advertising in a particular market will eventually lead to lower prices over time due to heightened
competition among producers and market based retailers.128
A common explanation pharmaceutical companies give for any increase in drug prices is a corresponding
rise in their own Research and Development (R&D) costs. While opponents argue against this assertion
by citing lower drug costs in neighboring Mexico and Canada, drug manufacturers claim that because the
additional R&D costs are incurred in the US, they are rolled into US prices.129 Pharmaceutical companies
also cite the FDA’s prolonged drug approval process as a contributing factor to higher prices because it
shortens the amount of time in which companies can market a drug under an exclusive patent; the price
must be higher in order to recoup their initial development costs.130 The manufacturers warn that reducing
the amount they recover for a drug while it is under patent will dramatically reduce the both the incentives
126Richard Manning, Ph.D. and Alison Keith, Ph.D., Prescription Drug Advertising: Empowering Consumers Through Infor-
mation: The Economics of Direct to Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 2 Economic Realities in Health Care
Policy 3 (2001). It is important to note that this report was funded by Pﬁzer, a leading pharmaceutical manufacturer.
127Id. at 7.
128Id. One problem with this argument, however, is that DTC ads are not limited to products with a competitor in the
marketplace. For drugs without any competition, it is impossible for ads to lower prices – they are the only drug on the shelf.
129When US drug prices are compared to the cost of the same drugs in both Canada and Mexico, US prices are almost always
higher. For more on this issue of price discrepancy, see David E. Rosenbaum, Health Insurance Provides Buﬀer to Rising Drug
Prices for Most Americans, The NY Times, June 1, 2000.
130Patents are granted for a period of twenty years at the beginning of the drug development process, often leaving only seven
to ten years of exclusive marketing privileges after development and FDA approval.
34and available funding for investment in future R&D.131 Pharmaceutical proﬁts should be viewed, they argue,
as a necessary condition for the development of healthcare.
Another industry explanation for the rising cost of prescription drugs is the steady increase in usage and
changes in the types of drugs most often prescribed.132 In 1998, the average American consumer took 10
prescriptions, one more than in 1996 and three more than 1992.133 “The type of drugs people are tak-
ing is also getting more costly as new, more expensive drugs replace older, less expensive drugs, such as
generics.”134 Patients are also taking drugs for conditions not previously treated by medication. According
to the industry, all of these factors contribute to higher usage and the correlating increase in overall drug
expenditures that insurers and HMOs have experienced in the past few years.
In the end, DTC ad supporters conclude that not only is the cost of DTC advertising not aﬀecting the price
of drugs, but that the ads may actually lower the price of prescriptions. They claim that higher levels of
consumer awareness, information and demand will eventually give rise to a more competitive market that
will lower the cost of prescription drugs.135 This point raises a new charge by consumer advocates: if DTC
advertisements are not causing the price of prescription drugs to increase, are DTC ad budgets beneﬁting
from this market-based increase in proﬁt? Are pharmaceutical companies applying these proﬁts to their
DTC ad expenditures rather than using the funds for research and development? Drug manufacturers and
DTC proponents say no, arguing that the increase in proﬁts is being applied to R&D in an eﬀort to develop
their next blockbuster drug.136 Consumer groups and DTC ad opponents disagree, but their disagreement
lacks any substantial proof.
Despite the arguments in favor of DTC ads, consumer groups and insurers continue to believe that the
131Gregg Easterbrook, The Drug Wars, The Industry Standard, May 29, 2001 available at
www.biohope.org/media/article print.cfm?articleid=1277 (last visited April 16, 2002).
132See Sarah A. Webster, Pill ads raise drug costs, The Detroit News, May 6, 2001 at 13.
133Id.
134Id.
135Merrill Matthews, Jr., PhD., Answering Critics of the Pharmaceutical Industry, IPI Ideas (Institute for Policy Innovation),
March 21, 2001 at 5.
136Id.
35correlation between the high cost of DTC advertising and the increase in prescription drug prices is more
than coincidence. They counter the industry’s R&D explanation by citing a larger allocation of dollars to
marketing and administrative budgets than to R&D budgets.137 “The drug industry’s top priority increas-
ingly is advertising and marketing, [increasing] almost 40% a year since...1997. Moreover, the Fortune 500
drug companies dedicated 30 percent of their revenues to marketing and administration in the year 2000,
and just 12 percent to R&D.”138 DTC ad critics also argue the implausibility of the industry’s statement
that a prolonged FDA approval process has contributed to higher prices. In fact, they say, the average time
for FDA approval has decreased since the guidance was issued in 1997.139
Moving beyond the ﬁnancial implications of DTC ads (a proﬁtable success that has fulﬁlled drug companies’
ﬁduciary duties to their shareholders), and considering that drug manufacturers are an integral part of
the American healthcare system, some commentators have argued that drug manufacturers have an ethical
duty to consider patient interests when developing DTC ad campaigns. In a Washington Post editorial,
Harvard Medical School professors Marcia Angell and Arnold Relman argue that pharmaceutical companies
have a fundamental duty to serve patient interests because “[p]rescription drugs are not like discretionary
consumer products. For millions of patients, they are necessary to health and even survival.”140 Drs. Angell
and Relman believe the true “purpose” of DTC advertising is education, not marketing, and that DTC ads
should be approached as such by the drug companies. While this imposition of an ethical duty might provide
fodder for patient activists and physicians groups, it is not likely to have much bearing on the FDA’s legal
137Public Citizen, Massachusetts Consumers Pay More for Prescription Drugs while Pharmaceutical Proﬁts Soar, October
11, 2000 available at http://www.citizen.org/congress/reform/state rx price/articles.cfm?ID=812 (last visited April 18,
2002).
138Public Citizen, Rx R&D Myths: The Case against the Drug Industry’s R&D ‘Scare Card,’ September 6, 2001 available at
www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7065 (last visited April 16, 2002).
139For more on the FDA’s innovations to speed up the drug approval process, see http://www.fda.gov/cder/fdainnovate.htm
(last visited April 18, 2002).
140Marcia Angell and Arnold S. Relman, Editorial: Prescription for Proﬁt, The Washington Post, June 20, 2001 at A27.
36approach to DTC ad requirements.
Despite the past successes of DTC promotion, there is a frightening change in the legal landscape looming
for pharmaceutical companies – a change that could alter the way companies approach the advancement
of DTC ads and other forms of consumer communication. Recent decisions in several state courts suggest
that there may soon be a break down in one of the most stringent modern-day liability shields: the learned
intermediary doctrine (the “doctrine”).
According to the doctrine, drug manufacturers are required to provide adequate warnings about the prescrip-
tion drugs they produce to physicians and other health care providers who in turn prescribe the medication
to patients. Manufacturers are not required to communicate such risks directly to consumers because the
prescribing physicians are required to give the patient all of the information regarding risks, side eﬀects,
and contraindications. The health care provider who prescribes the drug is the “learned intermediary,” and
liability for patient harms that are a result of inadequate risk information lies with the prescribing doctor
rather than the manufacturer.
The policy behind the doctrine is based on the theory that physicians, as experts, are in a better position
than the consumer or the drug manufacturer to adequately assess the drug’s particular eﬀects on the indi-
vidual.141 In many states, the doctrine has been incorporated into a product liability statute. Through the
years, state courts and legislatures have developed some limited exceptions to the doctrine, including cases
where large numbers of patients were misinformed in association with mass immunizations or FDA-mandated
patient disclosures.142
A 1999 New Jersey Supreme Court decision threatens to add one more important limitation to the doctrine.
141See Nadal, supra note 24, at 454.
142Jack E. Karns, Direct Advertising of Prescription Drugs: The Duty to Warn and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 3 DePaul
J. Health Care L. 273, 278 (2000).
37In Perez et. al. v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc.,143 the Court held that:
The direct marketing of drugs to consumers generates a corresponding duty requiring man-
ufacturers to warn of defects in the product. The FDA has established a comprehensive
regulatory scheme for direct-to-consumer marketing of pharmaceutical products. Given the
presumptive defense that is aﬀorded to pharmaceutical manufacturers that comply with
FDA requirements, we believe that it is fair to reinforce the regulatory scheme by allowing,
in the case of direct-to-consumer marketing of drugs, patients deprived of reliable medical
information to establish that the misinformation was a substantial factor contributing to
their use of a defective pharmaceutical product.144
The Perez case involved a DTC print campaign for the contraceptive Norplant that began appearing in
women’s magazines (Cosmopolitan, Glamour, and Mademoiselle) in 1991. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., the
manufacturer of Norplant, did not warn readers of any risks or side eﬀects in the ads, assuming instead that
the doctrine transferred the responsibility for such warnings to the prescribing physician.145 Wyeth Labs
did, however, contact physicians, advising them as to the ad campaign and preparing them to receive patient
inquiries about the product.146
In Perez, the court considered the aﬀect of DTC on patient behavior and concluded that Wyeth did not do
enough to warn patients considering the direct nature of their communication. The court found that, “as a
result of direct advertising, patients now enter their physician’s oﬃce with preconceived expectations about
their treatment,”147 thereby reducing the inﬂuence a physician’s warnings will have on patient perceptions.
This ruling excludes pharmaceutical companies from the doctrine’s protection under the New Jersey Product
Liabilities Act unless the company complies with all FDA regulations governing consumer communication.148
While the Perez decision is based on state tort law and is therefore limited to lawsuits ﬁled in New Jersey,
the decision has received tremendous notice and has been followed in the 2nd, 3rd and 7th Circuits and
143734 A.2d 1245 (NJ 1999).
145Id. at 1248.
146Id.
147Karns, supra note 142, at 286 – 87.
148Id. Because the Norplant ad campaign occurred prior to the release of the 1997 draft guidance, there was no DTC ad
blueprint for Wyeth to follow in 1991.
38in the states of Connecticut and Nebraska.149 However, the Perez decision was accompanied by a very
strong dissent, and the ruling is in direct conﬂict with a 5th Circuit ﬁnding in a similar Norplant case
that no additional duty is created by the use of DTC.150 “After reviewing the Perez opinion, it is diﬃcult
to determine who was the true winner. On one hand, consumers of prescription drugs will...receive the
beneﬁt of the protections provided by FDA regulations, especially in DTC advertising, as Perez demands
and rewards FDA compliance. On the other hand, prescription drug manufacturers receive the conclusive
presumption of an adequate warning by complying with FDA standards. Arguably both sides can claim
a somewhat tainted victory.”151 While the extension of Perez to other jurisdictions is not inevitable, the
threat of extensive liability exposure on ad campaigns that are released without pre-market approval by
the FDA may cause pharmaceutical companies to more carefully weigh the beneﬁts and rewards of DTC
advertising.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers have beneﬁted enormously from the FDA’s guidance on DTC ads, reaping the
rewards of consumer activism and capitalizing on the opportunity to “provide useful healthcare information”
to the general consumer. However, despite any sincere intention to contribute to the public health, it cannot
be disputed that pharmaceutical companies are in no way duty-bound to make decisions based solely on the
public’s best interests. Corporations have legal responsibilities to shareholders that require them to put proﬁt
ahead of other considerations despite their legitimate intention to “do the right thing.” The FDA, physicians,
and most importantly consumers must keep in mind that the ultimate impetus behind DTC advertising is
proﬁt, and the FDA approach to monitoring DTC ads should always consider the understandably biased
motives of the industry.
149See Vitanza v. Upjohn Corp., 214 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2000); RTC v Fidelity & Deposit Co., 205 F.3d 615 (3d Cir. 2000);
Eve v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 2001 US Dist. LEXIS 4531 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 7, 2001); Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829
(Conn. 2001); Freeman v. Hoﬀman – La Roche, 618 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 2000).
150In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation, 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999).
151P. Terrence Gaﬀney, NJ High Court Scuttles Learned-Intermediary Rule, 22 The National Law Journal B11, May 22,
2000.
39INSURERS, HMOs, AND THIRD PARTY PAYERS
Over the past two decades, the American healthcare industry has seen a dramatic shift in the way medical
services are delivered to consumers. The development of Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) has altered
the physician/patient relationship by inserting a third party payer into the medical decision-making process,
thereby aﬀecting the way doctors communicate with patients about healthcare options and inevitably af-
fecting the choices that are made. It is this third party payer system, which often leaves the patient feeling
removed from his or her healthcare, which the pharmaceutical industry cites as evidence of the need for DTC
advertising.
According to drug companies, insurers are making consumer engagement in their own healthcare more dif-
ﬁcult by imposing approved lists and expense limitations for prescription drugs. Insurers, MCOs, Health
Management Organizations (HMOs), and other third party payers exercise a great deal of control over what
medications are available under the patient’s or employer’s health plan, often creating tension when the
physician or the patient wishes to deviate from those standards. Insurers answer this allegation by citing the
rising cost of prescription drugs, thereby shifting the blame for limited patient access to the pharmaceutical
companies.
Recent statistics have shown that MCO pharmacy costs increased between eight and twenty percent in
1998,152 and prescription drugs make up approximately 17% of every health care dollar the average MCO
plan spends, up from only 9.2% in 1990.153 Many third party payers believe that the enormous expense of
running a DTC ad campaign has an ultimate eﬀect on the cost of providing heavily promoted drugs to their
membership. “According to one integrated health system executive, ‘a major factor is precisely those drugs
152Terzian, supra note 34, at 160.
153Timothy F. Dickman & Howard R. Veit, Consumerism and Escalating Drug Costs: A Volatile Mix, 13 Drug Benefit
Trends 48 – 52 (2001) available at www.medscape.com/viewarticle/409975 (last visited April 16, 2002).
40being advertised; they are the ones showing the greatest per-member/per-month increases.”’154
In response to the increased cost of prescription drugs, many employers are feeling the squeeze as their
beneﬁt premiums continue to rise. As a result, “[e]mployers, frustrated by seeing little return for managing
employee health beneﬁts, are trying to shift increasing costs back onto employees.”155 Employers, in an
eﬀort to lower their own costs, are reducing the healthcare beneﬁts their employees receive. These cutbacks,
a direct result of the employer’s desire to reduce overhead, ultimately leave the consumer holding the bag.
In addition to employee beneﬁt cutbacks, HMOs have begun to reduce prescription expense allowances in
their beneﬁt plans. The new plans actively encourage and reward the use of generic drugs, with some even
excluding very popular drugs that are heavily promoted by DTC ads (drugs which are often more expen-
sive than other medications). While patients and pharmaceutical companies may see this as a potentially
dangerous reduction in patient care, many third party payers blame the changes on the rising cost of pre-
scription drugs and the eﬀect DTC ads on consumer expectations; they say the ads manipulate consumers
into believing that they need the most heavily advertised, often more expensive drugs. 156 Atheer Kaddis,
director of pharmacy services at Michigan’s Blue Cross, says that “the medication that’s being advertised is
portrayed as the best possible therapy. That may not necessarily be true.157
As employers and insurers begin to reduce the amount they are willing to pay for prescription drugs, often
citing DTC as a contributing factor, the ultimate price for these drugs may eventually fall to the consumer,
thereby creating a whole new debate for the pharmaceutical industry. The possibility exists that a continued
resistance by healthcare plans to pay for “brand name” drugs will reduce the initial return on investment
drug manufacturers expect from DTC advertising. In the alternative, “DTC advertisements may increase
physician and patient pressure on MCOs to ensure that the drugs they want are included”158 in their health-
154Id.
155Id.
156See Webster, supra note 132.
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158Terzian, supra note 34, at 159 – 60.
41care coverage. “If there is enough pressure from both physicians and patients, these third party payers will
be forced to consider including popular, yet expensive, drugs or risk losing subscribers to other plans that
do.”159 Only time will tell which way the pendulum will swing.
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Since the FDA issued the 1997 draft guidance, the agency has conducted two studies on the eﬀectiveness
of DTC advertising and the impact it has on consumers. The most recent study, undertaken in 2001, has
not yet been released, but if the ﬁndings are similar to those issued in 1999, the pharmaceutical companies
will continue to ﬁnd refuge in the FDA’s statistical support for the use of DTC ads. However, regardless of
“consumer satisfaction,” and despite the FDA’s traditional support of the practice, changes to the current
state of DTC ads may be brewing in the halls of Congress.
In July 2001, Rep. Pete Stark (D – CA), the ranking member of the House Ways and Means Health Sub-
committee, introduced H.R. 2352, the Fair Balance Prescription Drug Advertisement Act (the “Fair Balance
bill”).160 The Fair Balance bill requires the compliance of pharmaceutical companies who elect to take a tax
deduction for advertising expenses with the following: all DTC advertisements must contain a “balanced
presentation” of beneﬁts and risks as measured by an “equal allocation” of broadcast air time or “equal
typeface” on the same or a facing page in print advertisements.161 Rep. Stark states that the impetus for
this bill is two-fold: his concern that consumers clearly understand the risks of an advertised drug, and
his belief that the increasing eﬀect ad expenditures are having on the cost of prescription drugs must be
stymied.162 He believes the bill will “decrease the economic incentives for DTC advertising by taking away
159Id.
160HR 2352, 107th Congress (2001).
161Id.
162Rep. Pete Stark, Unbalanced drug ads delude the customer, The Hill, July 18, 2001 available at
www.biohope.org/media/article print.cfm?articleid=1808 (last visited April 18, 2002).
42tax deductions for ads that are not fairly balanced.”163
Rep. Stark states that “[p]harmaceutical companies know that the demand they are creating with their
advertising allows them to charge almost any amount for their products,” and he correlates their “soaring
advertising expenditures” with the rising cost of drugs.164 He also cites the impact drug advertisements
have on patient requests to their doctors, stating a belief that “doctors should prescribe and insurance com-
panies should pay for those medications that are deemed necessary and appropriate for patients, and that
doctors should make those decisions outside the inﬂuence of advertising campaigns.”165 The bill’s standard
of compliance does not rely in any way on the FDA or its regulatory process, an omission that could perhaps
be interpreted as a direct aﬀront to the current state of regulation. On July 16, 2001, the bill was referred
to the Ways and Means Committee and the House Energy Committee. It has gained ten sponsors in the
ensuing months, but the bill has yet to be acted upon.
For a number of reasons, it is highly unlikely that this legislation will ever emerge from the Health Subcom-
mittee. First, the bill is not very eﬀective in altering the content or reducing the use of DTC advertising –
its vague requirements would either be easily met or scarcely enforced, and pharmaceutical companies will
do everything in their power to ensure that their tax deductions are safe. The bill is also of debatable First
Amendment Constitutionality as it presents a direct regulation of the content of speech with little correlation
to its purported goal.166 The strong consumer support for DTC ads and the lack of any apparent legislative
priority for DTC ad regulations also weigh against the success of this bill. However, its mere proposal sends
a message to pharmaceutical companies that some members of Congress are willing to connect the dots
between the rising cost of drugs and the promulgation of DTC ads. If costs continues to rise and the use of
DTC ads continues to grow, it seems likely that more proposals like the Fair Balance bill will be oﬀered in
163Id.
164Id.
165Id.
166For more on the Constitutionality of commercial speech, see infra Part IV: Advertising Industry and the Media, at 56.
43the years to come.
In addition to Rep. Stark’s proposed legislation, Congress has conducted two hearings within the past year
to discuss the rising cost of prescription drugs and the eﬀect of DTC advertising on that change. In June
2001, the House Energy Subcommittee for Health heard from a panel that included Dr. Janet Woodcock of
the FDA, Gregory J. Glover, an attorney with Ropes & Gray on behalf of PhRMA, Thomas Geiser, General
Counsel of Wellpoint Health Networks, and Jane Delgad of the National Alliance for Hispanic Health.167
On the Senate side, the Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee’s Subcommittee for Consumer
Aﬀairs held a hearing on July 24, 2001. Those testifying included Nancy Ostrove of the FDA, Dr. Sidney
Wolfe of Public Citizen, Dr. Michael Shaw of EthicAd, and Mr. Christopher Malineaux of PhRMA.168 At
both hearings, Congress expressed an interest in monitoring any possible connection between prescription
drug costs and the rise in DTC advertising. While no action has yet been taken on the basis of these dis-
cussions, the hearings sent a clear message: Congress is not yet convinced that DTC ads are necessarily the
best answer for consumers or third party payers.
STATE GOVERNMENT
While the regulation of prescription drugs is an entirely federal matter, the issue of DTC advertising has not
bypassed the states. In the past year, several state legislatures have proposed various forms of legislation,
all of which attempt to monitor the impact DTC ads have on drug prices within their states. According to
mid-2001 numbers, almost 60 bills addressing DTC advertising were up for consideration across the county,
with several other states already having enacted legislation.169 Interestingly, none of these bills include the
imposition of any substantive requirements for DTC ads; rather, the bills primarily establish systems for
167Recent Developments which may impact Consumer Access to, and Demand for, Pharmaceuticals Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on House of Representatives Health of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. (2001).
168Direct to Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Aﬀairs, Foreign Commerce,
and Tourism Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2001).
169Scott-Levin announces states take aim at Direct to Consumer drug ads, Business Wire, June 26, 2001.
44monitoring the relationship between ad expenditures and prescription drug costs. The impetus behind these
bills is the states’ concern with the cost of providing medication to patients on state Medicaid rolls – a
price that is ultimately borne by the taxpayer. As a result of this cost-control focus, none of the proposals
attempt to ensure or protect the real value of DTC ads: the “fair balance” presentation of important
healthcare information direct to consumers.
In West Virginia, the legislature passed a resolution entitled “The Prescription Drug Cost Management
Act,” which “require[es] prescription drug manufacturers to disclose to the state expenditures for advertising,
marketing and promotion, as well as for provider incentives and research and development eﬀorts....”170
The bill also creates a state program to complement and/or counteract these marketing eﬀorts by educating
consumers as to the costs and beneﬁts of particular prescription drugs.171 In Pennsylvania, a bill introduced
last year would permit the state’s Health Care Cost Containment Council to “collect data and provide
reports on prescription drug advertising and promotional activities.”172 The bill provides for the disclosure
of all advertising and promotional money spent inside the state, with the data to be organized by which
health care provider and/or audience was targeted by the promotion.173 In Massachusetts, Senate bill No.
1979 places the blame for rising drug costs squarely on the shoulders of ad and marketing expenses.174 The
bill’s sponsors claim that Massachusetts, due to its role as a “major purchaser of prescription medication,”
must monitor the associated rising costs, and the bill requires broad reporting of all aggregate advertising
and promotional costs directed at managed care plans, HMOs, beneﬁts management groups, professionals,
hospitals, and consumers through Massachusetts media outlets.175
170W. Va. Code § 5-16C-9(4) (2001).
171See id. at (9)(5).
172See PA S.B. 127 (2001). The Bill was introduced on January 29, 2001and referred to the Senate Committee on Public
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174MA S.B. 1979 (2001), available at http://www.state.ma.us/legis/bills/st01979.htm (last visited April 18, 2002).
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45Other states have debated resolutions which ask the federal government to regulate DTC ads and drug
pricing simultaneously and to fund state-based programs that do the same – all in an eﬀort to control the
increasing price of drugs.176 The attempts by these states to require the disclosure of any relationship
between advertising expenses and the price of prescription drugs sends a message to drug manufacturers:
states, as third party payers, are not pleased with the rising cost of drugs and are actively searching for
creative ways to keep prices low. However, none of these state proposals or laws would have any substantive
eﬀect on the promulgation or distribution of healthcare information via DTC advertising.
ADVERTISING INDUSTRY AND THE MEDIA
With all the dollars being spent on DTC ads by pharmaceutical companies, it is not surprising that the
direct benefactors of those large marketing budgets, the advertising agencies and media outlets, are strong
supporters of DTC ads and the FDA’s 1999 guidance. Currently, DTC prescription drug advertising is the
sixth largest ad category in the United States.177
Advertising agencies and print publications beneﬁted somewhat from prescription drug print ads before the
1997 draft guidance was issued, a beneﬁt not shared by the broadcast media. Pharmaceutical companies in-
vested only $595 million in television DTC ads in 1996, which was a 212% increase over the previous year.178
However, with the issuance of the 1997 draft guidance, those numbers began to increase in dramatic fashion
as drug manufacturers and ad agencies became comfortable with the FDA’s DTC advertising blueprint.
The FDA’s new approach to DTC ads generated a niche for advertising agencies and mainstream media
outlets. In 1998, the ﬁrst full year under the draft guidance, the top prescription drug advertisers spent 44%
176See Scott-Levin, supra note 169.
177The American Advertising Federation, AAF National Conference Video Archive (2001) available at
www.aaf.org/calendar/aac video.html (last visited April 17, 2002).
178See Terzian, supra note 34, at 164.
46more on DTC ads than on physician directed materials ($665 million vs. $462 million).179 By the year 2000,
the drug industry’s DTC ad expenditures topped more than $2.5 billion, ﬁlling the pockets and portfolios
of advertising executives, broadcasters, and the media.180 For example, CommonHealth, the top ranking
advertising agency that focuses primarily on healthcare, reported a gross income of $158.7 million in 2000,
up 16.3% from 1999.181
Many ad industry organizations, including the American Advertising Foundation (AAF) and the Coalition
for Healthcare Communication (CoHealthcom), have spent hundreds of hours and thousands of dollars lob-
bying members of Congress and the FDA to dismiss consumer groups’ calls for more restrictions on DTC
advertising. The advertisers assert the “consumer beneﬁt” argument of their pharmaceutical clients, stating
that further regulations would reduce consumer participation in health care by reducing the amount of direct
information they receive. Most of these advertising groups accept the current guidance, and most support
the idea of federal regulatory oversight, but several believe the current adequate provision requirement is too
prohibitive of speech and too diﬃcult to satisfy in a 30-second spot. There are even some industry groups
that go so far as to call for a change in who regulates prescription drug advertisements.
In CoHealthcom’s Position Statement on DTC ads, the organization states that “...the functions of approv-
ing new drugs and monitoring the marketing of existing drugs should be separated in order to eliminate the
implicit threat of withholding drug approval where there is a disagreement over marketing questions.”182
This statement questions the FDA’s competence to regulate DTC ads; however, no such accusation of biased
conduct has ever been reported. It seems CoHealthcom, an ad industry coalition formed speciﬁcally to urge
support for DTC ads, is willing to make any argument it can in an eﬀort to remove DTC ad regulation
179Mercedes Yanks $100M Account from Lowe, Advertising Age, February 11, 1999 at 36.
180AAF, supra note 177.
181Top 25 Healthcare Agencies, Advertising Age available at www.adage.com/page.cms?pageId=401 (lasts visited April 17,
2002). CommonHealth, located in Parsippany, New Jersey, is the agency responsible for the Claritin account.
182Coalition for Healthcare Communication, The Coalition’s Positions: FDA Reform, (2001) available at
www.cohealthcom.org/pages2/positions.html (last visited April 17, 2002).
47from the FDA. Why would an ad industry coalition take up such an unlikely initiative? There are several
possibilities.
It is possible the advertising industry would prefer to streamline its dealings with the federal government
by placing all of their “regulators” in one agency – the FTC. It is also possible that the industry believes
the FDA simply knows too much about the drugs that are advertised. By removing the regulation of “drug
ads” from the “drug regulator,” it is possible that DTC ad restrictions would mirror more closely the less-
restrictive regulations placed on other types of products. However, despite CoHealthcom’s position, the
initiative will likely stall with their statement. No such proposal has been made, and any chance of success
is practically inexistent.
The AAF, apparently resigned to the FDA’s regulatory authority over DTC ads, recently hosted a workshop
at their annual meeting entitled “Direct-To-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs.” The panel, which
included advertising professionals, pharmaceutical representatives, and an academic, addressed the growth,
beneﬁts, regulation and ethics of DTC advertising. The discussion focused primarily on strategies for such
advertising and whether the ads actually arm consumers with accurate and useful information about disease
and the risks of certain drugs.
The AAF panel indicated that drug manufacturers are currently looking for ways to expand their campaigns
to new “media outlets” – the Internet, sporting stadiums, etc. - and to ﬁnd new “consumer connection
points” for each drug’s target audience.183 As Kim B. Rotzol, dean of the College of Communications at
the University of Illinois-Champaign, pointed out, this initiative is necessary because the current American
healthcare system doesn’t allow enough access to or time with a doctor to provide patients with everything
they need to know.184 Rotzol admits that DTC ads can at times seem intrusive, raising very personal issues
in very public ways. However, he says this approach “may be the strongest ethical pillar that DTC ads have
183See AAF, supra note 177.
184Id.
48to rely upon.... [They give] consumers the opportunity to think about whether they have an untreated
illness” about which they should consult a doctor.185
Rotzol cautioned that pharmaceutical companies and their ad agencies should remember the weaknesses of
DTC ads and account for them in ad content; speciﬁcally, these ads often target vulnerable populations (the
elderly), are just a one-sided communication, and assume a rational marketplace that isn’t always present.186
Nick Cannistraro, president and general manager of Newspaper National Network, stated that by keeping
in mind the point of DTC advertising – consumer empowerment – advertisers can ethically yet persuasively
present truthful information in accordance with the FDA guidance. Total disclosure, he says, is a method
that both captures and informs the audience while beneﬁting manufacturers as well.187
In addition to adverting agencies, the media - newspapers, magazines, and broadcasters - have a substantial
ﬁnancial stake in continued FDA support for DTC ads. The Newspaper Association of American and the
Magazine Publishers of America recently teamed up to submit an oﬃcial comment to the proposed 2001 new
guidance.188 The letter posits that the continued use of DTC ads will “reward consumers’ eﬀorts to learn
more about prescription pharmaceuticals” and foster continued consumer involvement.189
While the interest of all media in the promulgation of DTC ads would seemingly be aligned, it is interesting
to note that most DTC ad money is spent on television ads, thereby suggesting a schism in interest between
print and broadcast media. However, because one of the elements in the 1999 guidance’s “adequate provision”
185Id.
186Id.
187Id.
188Letter from Newspaper Association of America and the Magazine Publishers of America to FDA (July 23, 2001) (on ﬁle
with the author).
189Id.
49requirement is reference to a concurrent print ad, it is actually in their best interest for the print media to
support the growth of broadcast DTC ads. Not only will print publications beneﬁt from the DTC ads run
in their own material, but they beneﬁt from ads that air in the broadcast media as well.
One very strong argument that the media, advertisers, and pharmaceutical companies have on their side of
the DTC advertising debate is the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. This fundamental
right, which has been extended to advertisements in numerous court opinions, makes it diﬃcult for regulators
to impose heavy restrictions on commercial speech. The ultimate authority in this area, Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v Public Service Commission,190 provides a four-prong test for determining the
constitutionality of government restrictions on commercial materials. The court must consider whether (1)
the speech is misleading or concerns unlawful activity; (2) the government has shown a substantial interest
in restricting such speech; (3) the government has shown that the regulation directly advances the interest
it asserts; and (4) the restriction is not more extensive than necessary to reach the governmental interest.191
In the case of prescription drugs and the FDA, the government has successfully argued in previous cases
that its interest in protecting public health and safety and in limiting misleading claims satisﬁes the Central
Hudson test. However, it should be reiterated that the absolute preemption of speech is not only disfavored
by the courts, but it is strictly prohibited by the Act itself.192
The courts have also addressed attempts by state legislatures to circumvent the FDA prescription drug ad
regulations. In Knoll v Sherman,193 a district court invalidated a state statute that prohibited the advertising
of federally scheduled drugs even if the ad satisﬁed the FDA’s established guidelines. The court applied the
Central Hudson test to ﬁnd that the statute did not materially advance the state’s objective of preventing
drug abuse.194
190447 U.S. 557 (1980) [hereinafter “Central Hudson”].
191Id. at 566.
192See infra Part II: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, at 5.
19357 F.Supp.2d 615 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
194Id.
50The protections that Central Hudson and Knoll oﬀer to pharmaceutical manufacturers is diﬃcult to refute –
the protection of speech and the freedom to truthfully promote a product is vital in an open market society.
However, it is interesting to note that Central Hudson and Knoll do not prevent the FDA from strictly
regulating the speech content of package labeling for prescription drugs. Is there a reason why labels and
DTC ads should be treated diﬀerently under a First Amendment test?
The answer lies in the degree and likelihood of harm that would result if the government did not closely
monitor the content of each type of communication. If prescription drug labels do not fully disclose all of
the information a patient needs to accurately treat their illness, great harm could be done to the patient.
The government restrictions on this type of potentially-harmful speech clearly satisfy Central Hudson’s
“substantial interest” and “no more extensive than necessary” requirements. DTC advertisements, on the
other hand, are less likely to cause such direct and serious harm simply because the ad’s content is something
less than what the FDA would have chosen if it had the authority to script DTC ads. The physician’s role
as a prescription drug gatekeeper serves as protection enough, making any pre-emptive regulations “more
extensive than necessary” to realize the FDA’s protective goals.
Despite the First Amendment’s limitations on what the FDA can require of pharmaceutical advertisers, it
still seems as though the very nature of prescription drugs should impose a greater duty on companies who
market them to the general public. Prescription drugs are not just another product; rather, they have the
power to both save and destroy lives. Advertisers must be aware of the potentially harmful eﬀects their ad
campaigns could have on the health of consumers. If the advertising and pharmaceutical industries take this
charge seriously, and if the FDA fulﬁlls its responsibility by continuing to enforce regulations that protect
consumer health, DTC ads can be a powerful tool for informing patients and medical providers while also
51serving their intended purpose: to sell prescription drugs.
V. THE EFFECT OF DTC ADVERTISING ON A REPRESENTATIVE DRUG: CLARITIN
In order to better understand the impact of DTC promotion on consumer behavior and the pharmaceutical
market, it may be useful to consider the history of the most famous DTC advertising campaign to date:
Schering-Plough’s Claritin. Whether it was timing, innovative advertising, or just sheer luck, Schering-
Plough saw industry-breaking records in the late 1990s with an ad campaign that began with the simplicity
of blue skies.
Patented in 1981 and introduced in 1993, Schering-Plough marketed Claritin (loratdine) as the antihistamine
for the future by promoting its ability to relieve allergy symptoms without the usual side eﬀects (drowsiness).
However, despite its reputation as a breakthrough drug, Claritin was not the ﬁrst non-sedating antihistamine
to be created. It was, however, the ﬁrst of its kind to make it all the way through the FDA’s approval
process.195
In 1995, the same year the FDA announced its intention to proceed with new guidelines on broadcast
DTC advertising, Schering-Plough began running a series of “reminder ads” on national television. The
ads mentioned only Claritin’s name and advised consumers to “talk to their doctors” about the drug. For
consumers, this form of advertisement was incredibly frustrating – they wondered: what is Claritin? What
is it for? Should I go to the doctor and ﬁnd out what this is? Should I try to get a prescription? This
response to the Claritin reminder ads was an example of the “irrational marketplace,” lending support to
195Stephen S. Hall, Prescription for Proﬁt, The NY Times Magazine, March 11, 2001, 40 – 45, 59, 91 – 92, 100. The
antihistamines that preceded Claritin faced FDA opposition because of harmful side eﬀects, and they were therefore never
marketed to physicians.
52the position that “more is more” when it comes to the disclosure of prescription drug information.
When the FDA released its 1997 draft guidance, Claritin was the ﬁrst drug to run a full product-claim
advertisement under the new regulations. The campaign, entitled “Claritin Blue Skies,” ﬁrst aired in prime
time on August 15, 1997, and Schering-Plough president Richard W. Zahn stated: “Under the old FDA
guidelines, it was diﬃcult for TV viewers to understand that Claritin is indicated for the treatment of seasonal
allergies.... With new informative Claritin DTC advertising, consumers will have a clearer understanding
of the beneﬁts of Claritin.” 196
Unfortunately, the company’s much awaited launch was short lived. Schering-Plough chose not to submit
their ads to the DDMAC for approval prior to their broadcast, and on August 19, 1997, the FDA issued
the ﬁrst in a series of “warning letters” regarding the Blue Skies TV commercials.197 Schering-Plough’s
advertising agency responded quickly to correct the numerous violations cited in the letters, violations which
included a misleading major statement of risks.198 The FDA responded with one follow up letter and another
“informal” criticism before the campaign was free of violations.199 Despite their tangles with the DDMAC,
Claritin’s DTC ads had a deﬁnitive impact as sales began to soar. However, those sales came with a hefty
price tag as Schering-Plough’s cost of sales increased dramatically.200
DTC opponents often claim that, as the cost of sales and advertising increased for Schering-Plough, so did
the cost of Claritin. In 1994, prior to the release of the FDA 1997 draft guidance, the price of Claritin was
$2.35/pill. That price rose to $2.83/pill by 1998 – a 20% increase.201 In comparison, between 1993 and 1998,
the price of the average prescription drug rose only 12% per year.202 Today, the price of Claritin is lower
196Schering Laboratories to Release New Claritin(R) TV Advertising Campaign, PR Newswire, August 14, 1997.
197See Letter from FDA to Ronald J. Garutti, M.D., Director, Marketed Products Support, Worldwide Regulatory Aﬀairs,
Schering Corp. (August 19, 1997) available at www.fda.gov/cder/warn/aug97/5738.pdf (last visited April 17, 2002).
198See id.
199See Letter from FDA to Alexander R. Giaquinto, Ph.D.., Senior Vice President, Worldwide Regulatory Aﬀairs, Schering
Corp. (September 8, 1997) available at www.fda.gov/cder/warn/sep97/5760.pdf (last visited April 17, 2002).
200For a detailed look at the cost of sales and net sales for Schering-Plough and Claritin, see Appendix 3.
201Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary (May 21,
1998) (testimony of Mr. Bruce Downey, President and CEO of Barr Laboratories).
202Generic Pharmaceutical Association (December 1999) available at http://www.gphaonline.org/about/ (last visited April
53that in 1998, averaging $2.66/pill, but so is the cost of sales for Schering-Plough.
DTC ad opponents also point to the fact that, as Claritin’s popularity and price continued to grow, a
considerable diﬀerence between Claritin prices in the US and Claritin prices in neighboring countries began
to emerge. For example, a one month supply of Claritin in the US today costs an average $80; in Canada
and Mexico, where Claritin is sold OTC, the cost averages only $10-15 per month.203 The diﬀerence, say
opponents, is that Mexico and Canada do not allow DTC marketing of prescription drugs.
Pharmaceutical companies, including Schering-Plough, attribute all price increases and any cost diﬀerentials
to a variety of political and economic factors (inﬂation, rising R&D and regulatory expenses, more healthcare
price control by the governments of other countries). However, critics of DTC ads continue to correlate the
growth of expensive DTC advertising with the increasing cost of the drug in the US and the lower cost in
other countries.
Despite the company’s obvious proﬁts, it is possible that Claritin’s clever marketing eﬀorts worked too well
for Schering-Plough, reaching beyond what the drug itself was capable of delivering. Steve Hall, a writer
for The New York Times Magazine, reports that when Claritin did not work for him, he asked his doctor if
other patients had experienced similar dissatisfaction. The doctor noted anecdotally that, in his experience,
only 30-40% of patients (an estimate he characterized as “generous”) found that Claritin actually worked to
relieve their allergies.204 Yet despite reports of dissatisfaction among patients and doctors, Claritin remained
one of the most prescribed prescription medications of the late 1990s. Hall’s anonymous doctor’s estimate is
clearly an arguable one; even his own partner in practice disputes the ﬁgure by estimating that 50-55% of his
patients were helped by the drug.205 It is likely that these anecdotal estimates of eﬀectiveness are equally
as low for other brand name allergy mediations – medications simply do not work for everyone. However,
28, 2002).
203Hall, supra note 195, at 40.
204Id. at 40.
205Id.
54the assessment made by Hall’s physician common enough to generate a class action lawsuit that questions
the eﬃcacy of Claritin.
Prescription Access Litigation (PAL), a Boston-based non-proﬁt organization, was established in 2001. It’s
mission is to develop and pursue class action litigation in the hope of raising public awareness of prescription
drug “misinformation campaigns” (DTC ads), the ineﬀectiveness of such drugs over generic alternatives, and
the eﬀects of DTC promotion on the cost of medication. 206 PAL sees favorable monetary judgments for
such claims as a down payment in return for the millions of dollars PAL believes consumers and third party
payers have “overpaid” for name brand prescription drugs.207
In August 2001, PAL ﬁled a lawsuit in New Jersey Superior Court against Schering-Plough, alleging that
Claritin advertising was deceptive under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.208 PAL claims that Claritin
is essentially ineﬀective, serving no better purpose than a sugar pill (a seemingly diﬃcult claim to make
based on Claritin’s NDA approval from the FDA in 1993). The PAL lawsuit also alleges that the “false,
deceptive and misleading advertising for Claritin has artiﬁcially inﬂated consumer demand.... In our view,
that elevated demand, in turn, has permitted Schering to price-gouge purchasers of Claritin by sustaining
the inappropriately elevated prices charged in the United States for the drug.”209 Due to PAL’s belief that
misleading DTC ads present an imminent harm to public health, they are requesting a permanent injunction
to “prevent future illegal advertising of Claritin.”210
The PAL lawsuit is pending, yet there is little chance their claims will succeed based on the available defenses
Schering-Plough has in its corner (FDA NDA approval and compliance with DTC ad regulations). However,
regardless of its success or failure in New Jersey, it seems probable that PAL will continue to pursue these
206Prescription Access Litigation, About Us, at www.prescriptionaccesslitigation.com/html/about.html (last visited April
17, 2002).
207Prescription Access Litigation, Frequently Asked Questions: Claritin Lawsuit, at
www.prescriptionaccesslitigation.com/html/claritin faqs.html (last visited April 17, 2002).
208Id.
209Id.
210Id.
55actions in states across the country to continue what it characterizes as a necessary “awareness campaign.”
Despite the defenses available to pharmaceutical companies, it seems possible that even the smallest risk of
tort liability for deceptive practices could encourage companies to more carefully screen DTC advertisements
for compliance. However, if the primary goal of PAL’s lawsuits is to reduce the amount of money spent on
DTC ads, they are likely to fail. So long as companies are in compliance with all FDA regulations on DTC
ads, there is a total defense against such claims and little chance of a reduction in use.
Schering-Plough announced in early 2002 that it would submit a request for a change in Claritin’s status
from prescription to Over-the-Counter, marking the end of its current patent period. In the company’s 2001
10-K ﬁled with the SEC, the company disclosed to its shareholders the impact this change in status and the
end of the patent is likely to have on Schering-Plough’s ﬁnancial status:
Management believes that either the introduction of generic prescription or OTC loratadine
or OTC Claritin in the U.S. market would likely have a rapid, sharp and material adverse
eﬀect on the Company’s results of operations beginning at the occurrence of such an event
and extending for an indeterminate period of time thereafter.211
Waiting in the wings to take Claritin’s place at the top of the antihistamine race is Clarinex, the new Claritin
“incarnation.” Schering-Plough hopes to switch loyal patients over to Clarinex before Claritin hits the OTC
shelves, thereby maintaining consumers at the higher prescription-price level. Whether or not Clarinex will
produce the same blockbuster results will depend on a host of factors, but one similarity has already been
proven: Schering-Plough has pulled out all the stops for an intensive media campaign to help launch the
product in the Winter/Spring of 2002.
VI. CONCLUSION
56Is it possible, after reviewing the history, impact, and debate over DTC ads, to draw a conclusion as to the
value and eﬃcacy of such advertising? The beneﬁts of DTC promotion are many. The ads are an eﬃcient
method of reaching a wide audience in an eﬀort to spread important information about healthcare options.
DTC ads arguably encourage consumers to visit their doctors, discuss possible ailments and treatments, and
open a dialogue in a medical environment that has not always welcomed patient initiative. DTC ads give
the consumer a sense of empowerment, enabling them to take control of their own medical destiny, and they
put more information into the marketplace for prescription drugs that will later be oﬀered OTC, after which
time there is very little disclosure required. It is also important to remember that commercial speech and
advertising is a protected First Amendment right, and any regulation of such must be carefully tailored to
achieve a substantial and distinct public interest. To date, the FDA has tailored its enforcement approach
to account for this important speech protection while also maintaining a vigilant watch over the content of
the ads.
On the ﬂip side, the negatives of DTC advertising are easy to note. DTC ads can at times be misleading
before the FDA can correct the problem, giving viewers a false perception of the drug’s beneﬁts and de-
emphasizing its risks. The ads have caused tension in the doctor/patient relationship when patients demand
drugs that, in the opinion of the physician, they do not need. Unfortunately, some doctors cave in to
these patient pressures, resulting in a potentially dangerous health situation for the patient. There is a risk
that consumers will forget that DTC advertising is just that – advertising – and that advertisements are
fundamentally intended to sell a product, not to empower the consumer. Finally, there is perhaps the most
controversial negative of DTC promotion: the rising cost of prescription drugs and the correlative increase
in pharmaceutical company expenditures for DTC ads.
57Under the current FDA guidance, DTC advertising has been a boom for the pharmaceutical industry,
advertising agencies, and the media. However, the long-term eﬀects of DTC ads have yet to be seen,
including what happens to a company’s ﬁnancials when a “blockbuster” drug, such as Claritin, loses its
exclusive marketing under a valid patent. If Wall Street doesn’t see something proﬁtable in the pipes, the
loss of a product that was made all the more proﬁtable by DTC ads could spell disaster for a pharmaceutical
company. Just ask Schering-Plough. However, it should also be noted that, regardless of whether a drug
has been promoted by DTC advertising, the loss of a patent will always cause ﬁnancial hardship for a
pharmaceutical company. This was most recently illustrated by the dramatic declines experienced by Eli
Lilly with the expiration of the Prozac patent in August 2001.
Are consumers more informed of their healthcare options because of DTC ads? Probably. Are they more
aware of the signs and symptoms of particular diseases? Perhaps. Are direct to consumer advertisements
the most impartial method of disseminating vital health information to consumers? Probably not. How-
ever, the ads are eﬀective in reaching a wide audience, consumers respond positively to their inclusion in
the mainstream media, and physicians seem to be adapting to their widespread use. DTC advertising even
seems to be winning over some of its most strident critics as Americans become more accustomed to the idea
of advertising prescription drugs on television.212
So long as DTC ads continue to be a proﬁtable exercise, pharmaceutical companies are likely to continue
using them regardless of whether “causation” can be established. If the measured positive impact of the ads
slows, so too will their presence in our daily lives. Why? Because despite the serious impact prescription
drugs have on people’s lives, the manufacturers who produce these drugs are ﬁrst and foremost businesses
212See Raja Mishra, Ex-FDA Chief Recants on Drug Advertising, The Boston Globe, April 17, 2002, at A2. Dr. David A.
Kessler, a staunch DTC opponent while head of the FDA in the mid 1990s, announced he had changed his position on this issue
while speaking at the DTC National Convention. “I was wrong....On the whole, I think there is a lot of educational beneﬁt.”
Id.
58that are required by law to place the interest of shareholders (and therefore proﬁt) above other considera-
tions.
Before DTC promotion exploded onto the scene in 1997, many consumers found it diﬃcult to get basic
information from a source other than their doctors. With the ensuing changes to the modern healthcare
system, consumers take relief in knowing that, while at times annoying, DTC ads are a constant source of
information on health and available treatment. However, consumers MUST be reminded that DTC ads are
fundamentally a form of promotion, and while they beneﬁt greatly from their use, consumers must balance
DTC ad information with alternative, traditional, and perhaps more complete sources of information.
The current approach taken by the FDA toward DTC advertising is the most balanced, fair, sensible, yet
protective approach possible for an eﬃcient continuation of regulatory monitoring. Some consumer groups
have called for pre-market approval of DTC advertisements, a suggestion made impossible by current First
Amendment doctrine. Some pharmaceutical organizations have called for fewer restrictions and the elimi-
nation of the adequate provision and major statement requirements, suggestions which should be dismissed
out of hand. If DTC advertisements are to be trusted by the medical community and consumers alike, they
must present as much information about the risks of a particular drug as they do about the beneﬁts. The
true value of DTC advertising lies in its ability to educate an otherwise ignorant public as to the possibilities
of drug therapy for diseases they may not even know exist. If this is to be realized, the FDA must continue
to demand “fair balance,” DDMAC must continue to ardently enforce the guidance requirements, and physi-
cians must be willing to intervene when a patient is on the wrong track as to which prescription medication
might be right for him. If each of the interested and aﬀected parties keeps in mind the true purpose and
public value of DTC ads, consumers should continue to beneﬁt from their promulgation well into the future.
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GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY1
Consumer-Directed Broadcast Adver-
tisements
I. INTRODUCTION
This guidance is intended to assist sponsors who are interested in
advertising their prescription human and animal drugs, including bio-
logical products for humans, directly to consumers through broadcast
media, such as television, radio, or telephone communications systems.2
II. BACKGROUND
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act) requires that
manufacturers, packers, and distributors (sponsors) who advertise pre-
scription human and animal drugs, including biological products for
humans, disclose in advertisements certain information about the adver-
tised product’s uses and risks. For prescription drugs and biologics, the Act
requires advertisements to contain information in brief summary relating
to side eﬀects, contraindications, and eﬀectiveness (21 U.S.C. 352(n)). The
resulting information disclosure is commonly called the brief summary.
The prescription drug advertising regulations (21 CFR 202.1) dis-
tinguish between print and broadcast advertisements. Print adver-
tisements must include the brief summary, which generally contains
each of the risk concepts from the product’s approved package la-
beling. Advertisements broadcast through media such as television,
radio, or telephone communications systems must disclose the prod-
uct’s major risks in either the audio or audio and visual parts of
the presentation; this is sometimes called the major statement.
This guidance does not address the major statement requirement.
Sponsors of broadcast advertisements are also required to present a
brief summary or, alternatively, may make adequate provision... for
dissemination of the approved or permitted package labeling in con-
nection with the broadcast presentation (21 CFR 202.1(e)(1)). This
is referred to as the adequate provision requirement. The regula-
tions thus specify that the major statement, together with adequate
provision for dissemination of the product’s approved labeling, can
provide the information disclosure required for broadcast advertisements.
The purpose of this guidance is to describe an approach that FDA believes
can fulﬁll the requirement for adequate provision in connection with
consumer-directed broadcast advertisements for prescription drug and
biological products. The approach presumes that such advertisements:
· Are not false or misleading in any respect. For a prescription drug, this
would include communicating that the advertised product is available
only by prescription and that only a prescribing healthcare profes-
sional can decide whether the product is appropriate for a patient.
· Present a fair balance between information
about eﬀectiveness and information about risk.
· Include a thorough major statement conveying all of the product’s
most important risk information in consumer-friendly language.
· Communicate all information relevant to the product’s indica-
tion (including limitations to use) in consumer-friendly language.
III. FULFILLING THE ADEQUATE PROVISION REQUIRE-
MENT
A sponsor wishing to use consumer-directed broadcast advertise-
ments may meet the adequate provision requirement through an approach
that will allow most of a potentially diverse audience to have reasonably
convenient access to the advertised product’s approved labeling. This
audience will include many persons with limited access to technologically
sophisticated outlets (e.g., the Internet) and persons who are uncomfort-
able actively requesting additional product information or are concerned
about being personally identiﬁed in their search for product information.
One acceptable approach to disseminating the product’s approved labeling
is described below. This approach includes the following components.
A. Disclosure in the advertisement of an operating toll-free tele-
phone number for consumers to call for the approved package la-
beling. Upon calling, consumers should be given the choice of:
· Having the labeling mailed to them in a timely manner (e.g.,
within 2 business days for receipt generally within 4-6 days); or
· Having the labeling read to them over the phone (e.g., by
oﬀering consumers a selection of prerecorded labeling topics).
B. Reference in the advertisement to a mechanism to provide package
labeling to consumers with restricted access to sophisticated technology,
such as the Internet, and those who are uncomfortable actively requesting
additional product information or are concerned about being personally
identiﬁed in their search for product information. One acceptable
mechanism would be to provide the additional product information in the
form of print advertisements appearing concurrently in publications that
reach the exposed audience. The location of at least one of these adver-
tisements would be referenced in the broadcast advertisement. If a print
advertisement is part of an adequate provision procedure, it should supply
a toll-free telephone number and an address for further consumer access
to full package labeling. This mechanism of providing access to product
labeling has the advantage of also providing considerable information in
the form of the required brief summary and in the advertising text itself.
When a broadcast advertisement is broadly disseminated, FDA
believes that ensuring that passive and privacy-sensitive informa-
tion seekers have adequate access to detailed product informa-
tion is critical to complying with the adequate provision regu-
latory requirement. Thus, print advertisements associated with
broadly disseminated broadcast advertisements should be compa-
rably broadly disseminated in terms of the targeted audiences.
An alternative mechanism for providing private access to product
information would be to ensure the availability of suﬃcient numbers of
brochures containing package labeling in a variety of publicly accessible
sites (e.g., pharmacies, doctors’ oﬃces, grocery stores, public libraries).
Brochures should be available at enough sites so that most consumers
exposed to the broadcast advertisement can obtain the labeling without
traveling beyond their normal range of activities. This alternative
mechanism is likely to be logistically feasible only when the associated
broadcast advertising campaign is relatively limited in audience reach.
C. Disclosure in the advertisement of an Internet web page
(URL) address that provides access to the package labeling.
D. Disclosure in the advertisement that pharmacists, physicians
(or other healthcare providers), or veterinarians (in the case of
animal drugs) may provide additional product information to con-
sumers. This statement should communicate clearly that the ref-
erenced professional is a source of additional product information.
Telephone advertisements that make a product claim (not reminder
advertisements) occur when there is a telephone communication between
an individual and a product’s sponsor where both a product name and
a representation or suggestion relating to a product (e.g., its indica-
tion) are disclosed by the sponsor. Under these circumstances, such
advertisements are subject to the disclosure requirements of the Act
and the regulations. However, telephone advertisements are diﬀerent
from advertisements broadcast through television and radio. By par-
ticipating in the telephone communication, the consumer has already
indicated his or her willingness to discuss the topic or receive additional
information. Consequently, adequate provision for disseminating product
labeling in connection with telephone advertisements may be achieved
with fewer of the components listed above. For such advertisements,
adequate provision could consist of the availability of the option of
having product labeling mailed to the caller in a timely manner (e.g.,
within 2 business days for receipt generally within 4-6 days), or having
the labeling read to them over the phone (e.g., by allowing consumers
to select from prerecorded labeling topics), as well as disclosing that
healthcare providers are a source of additional product information.
When a broadcast advertisement is presented in a foreign language,
the information sources that are part of the advertisement’s adequate
provision mechanism (i.e., print advertisements or brochures, web sites,
toll-free telephone number recorded messages or operators) should
be in the language of the broadcast ad. Regardless of the language
used for the advertisement, current broadcast advertising regulations
require the dissemination of approved product labeling, which, in
most cases, must be in English, and is generally written in language
directed to healthcare professionals. The Agency strongly encourages
sponsors to consider the beneﬁts of also providing consumers with
non-promotional, consumer-friendly product information in the language
of the broadcast ad (e.g., FDA-approved patient labeling or accu-
rate, consumer-friendly translations of product labeling information).
The FDA encourages sponsors who use this adequate provision
mechanism to collect relevant data on consumer use and make
their ﬁndings publicly known. FDA also encourages sponsors
and other interested parties to make known their research relat-
ing to the overall eﬀects of DTC promotion on the public health.
1 This guidance has been prepared by the Intra-Agency Group on
Advertising and Promotion at the Food and Drug Administration. This
guidance represents the Agency’s current thinking on procedures to fulﬁll
the requirements for disclosure of product information in connection
with consumer-directed broadcast advertisements for prescription human
and animal drugs, and human biological products. It does not create or
confer any rights for or on any person and does not operate to bind FDA
or the public. An alternative approach may be used if such approach
satisﬁes the requirements of the applicable statute, regulations, or both.
2 This guidance is not intended to cover the advertising of restricted
medical devices, which are subject to the requirements of section 502(r)
of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
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The following chart shows Schering-Plough’s net sales and cost of sales (advertising expenses, including DTC
and other promotional activities) from 1996 through 2001. The ﬁnancial information contained in this chart
was taken from Schering-Plough’s annual and periodic ﬁlings with the Securities Exchange Commission and
are available via search engine at www.sec.gov.
Information
taken from
Schering-
Plough SEC
Filings
Schering-
Plough
Cost of
Sales
Schering-
Plough Net
Sales
Cost of
Sales
attributed
to Claritin
Net Sales
attributed
to Claritin
1996 $1,078,000,000 $5,656,000,000 N/A $1,200,000,000
1997 1,308,000,000 6,778,000,000 $ 90,000,000 1,700,000,000
1998 1,601,000,000 8,077,000,000 182,900,000 2,300,000,000
1999 1,800,000,000 9,176,000,000 137,100,000 2,700,000,000
2000 1,902,000,000 9,815,000,000 99,700,000 3,000,000,000
2001 2,078,000,000 9,802,000,000 N/A 3,200,000,000
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